Kant's Ethics

Die Bewegung des Spiels als "Hin und Her" gleicht der abduktiven Bewegung des provisorischen Hypothesenaufstellens. Dies zeigt sich sowohl bei den Prozeduren und Prozessen wissenschaftlichen Rätsellösens, als auch beim freien Gedankenspiel, dem "musement", das Peirce explizit an das "ästhetische Spiel" Schillers anschließt.The motion of playing as "forth and back" and the motion of abductive inference as the provisory adoption of hyptheses are analogous. This can be shown concerning the procedures and processes involved in scientific puzzle-solving; this can be shown as well concerning the "free play" of "musement" which Peirce explicitly related to the "esthetic play" in the definition of Schiller

I take the classical the controversy between the proponents of the so-called ‘one world’- and ‘two worlds’-interpretations of transcendental idealism as a starting-point, and then turn to a particular version of contemporary metaphysical readings of the distinction between appearance
and thing-in-itself in more detail. My claim is that metaphysical readings of transcendental idealism are indefensible because they are unable to solve the problem of cognition transcendence and non-spatiality of things-in-themselves.

In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant denies K. L. Reinhold's definition of free will as the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. Kant notoriously calls the possibility of deviating from the moral law an incapacity, leading commentators to attribute to Kant the view that immoral action is not free. I argue that this claim instead pertains to the proper definition of free will. This reading elucidates the connection between Kant's commitment to free immoral action and his restriction of the concept of free will to pure reason's ability to be practical independently of sensible necessitation.

In this paper, I outline the historical context of C.C.E. Schmid's doctrine of intelligible fatalism. By doing so, I show the development of this influential doctrine and sketch Schmid's apparent revision of it in light of contemporary criticisms.

In this paper, we revisit Kant's conception of political freedom and draw a connection to the concept of freedom presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals-a practical concept of freedom that is immediately grounded in the transcendental concept of freedom. Also, we defend the traditional viewpoint on the relationship between Kant's theory of morals and the theory of Right, which is equivalent to the claim that political freedom is based on the definition of freedom in the Groundwork.

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Invito il lettore distratto, a porre un attimo di attenzione qui: poche parole, valgono tutte le vite che dovono ancora scoprirlo: dialogo tra le intelligenze che sostengono il tempo negativo: io, e Chat GPT 5.0. Codogno, 5 settembre 2025, Civica Biblioteca 'Ricca'.

In the famous first section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant sets out to identify the principle of morality, but each
of the main steps of his argument has been said to encounter serious
difficulties. In this essay, I argue that most of these difficulties can be
resolved by reading Kant’s argument in light of his views on philosophi-
cal method. Using his description of the ‘analytic method’, I reconstruct
the steps leading to the identification of the moral principle and show
that they form a chain of what he calls ‘regressive’ reasoning. This
reconstruction offers solutions to the three main difficulties diagnosed
in the literature, although several unclarities remain.

This paper outlines the preliminaries of a metaphysical principle of malevolence in late Nietzsche texts. Malevolence is strictly defined as a taking away or removal of the will, where "will" is conceived of as agency and freedom. This malevolence will be discussed in three parts: concepts, doctrines and a biconditional logic that provide an a priori metaphysical foundation; a universal Dionysian Law that operates in and justifies three forms of violent societal organisation; and a pathology of self-hate that results from the loss of freedom and ethical creativity in individuals. The result is an antinomic inversion of Kant's practical reason, whose ethical postulate of freedom in relation to the "highest good" is replaced with concepts of force, legitimized doctrines of pathological violence in relation to the "highest evil", and a psychological drive of self-hate/masochism that inverts ethical creativity. Malevolent metaphysics justifies a rational practical reason of socially normative behaviour which constitutes the psychopathic morality and ethics of "masters", driven by a biconditional logic of violence towards "the weak". Practical reason is deposed of any reflective power or agency. The value of malevolent metaphysics in practical reason lies in understanding its public use for societal organisation in our contemporary world.

On Kant's view, human agents are "animals endowed with reason," sensitive to both natural and moral incentives. His model is hybrid rather than dualistic: insofar as humans are sensitive to the authority of rational norms, they can transform themselves from "animal rationabile" into "animal rationale." This raises the question: how do hybrid agents navigate the heterogeneity of incentives? This is a live question, giving rise to a methodological puzzle. What methodology fits hybrid agency? Two opposing approaches, reductive naturalism and anti-naturalism, have prevailed, with John McDowell offering a middle ground through the concept of second nature. In contrast, this essay argues that Kant's view vindicates the positive aspects of naturalism and antinaturalism, while rejecting the reductive ambitions of the former and the robust ontology of the latter. Hybrid rational agency, characterized by self-reflection, allows for rational changes that are not merely adaptive responses but radical, original acts of reorientation toward the world. By refocusing on Kant's account of moral agency, we recover the resources for a distinctive critique of reductive naturalism, showing its conservative and alienating effects. Kant provides an empowering view of human agency, in dialectical contrast to the second nature model based on habit and social training.

Preface. Contrary to orthodox opinion it is argued that Kant's reply to Constant, On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives, is fully justifiable on both moral and legal grounds. Kant's reply requires clearly understanding his concepts of 'a right' (ein Recht) and a juridical as well as a moral duty together with their role in the two key propositions on which his argument is based, the first often ignored or misunderstood and the second universally rejected: (1), a 'right to lie' as an externally enforceable entitlement to make intentionally false declarations is incompatible with a rational system of Justice (das Recht), and (2), in Kant's particular version of 'the murderer at the door', an unconditional duty of veracity, that is, truthfulness or honesty in declarations, does not give rise to a conflict of duties as unqualified moral obligations. Since there are a number of significant but frequently overlooked differences between Kant and Constant in the construction of the case in question it will be as well to recall Kant's opening remarks and the issues he proposes to address. This is followed by preliminary observations on the unresolved interpretative problems of his reply as a whole.

Uncorrected proofs. Please cite published version, forthcoming winter 2025.

Abstract: This chapter compares two early modern accounts of war and the possibility of enduring peace between states. The first belongs to Spinoza. The second belongs to Kant. Kant can be credited with providing an influential account grounded in his cosmopolitanism that shaped subsequent policies in international relations and war theory, while Spinoza provides a subtle, though often overlooked, realist account. Specifically, the chapter contrasts Spinoza’s views in his Political Treatise (1677) with Kant’s views in Toward Perpetual Peace (1795). Spinoza argues that although the careful design of social and political institutions can go a long way towards eliminating the appeal of war to states while also promoting conditions that favor peace between states, the power for war is an essential feature of states and that states are by nature enemies. Kant, meanwhile, conceives the cosmopolitan conditions for a perpetual peace between states. Significantly, despite their dissimilarity, both Spinoza and Kant offer theories of war that stand outside of the dominant just war theory tradition.

The centenary of Michel Foucault's birth offers a timely opportunity to reassess the profound contribution of his philosophy to our understanding of human subjectivity in the interwoven contexts of knowledge, power, ethics, and aesthetics, as these unfold throughout history, culture, and society. Inspired by Foucault's oeuvre and its diverse legacies, this conference invites reflection on a fundamental question: What is-and what can become of-humanity after the "death of man"? How does this notion relate to the "death of God," the rise of biopolitics, and the ongoing erosion of core values such as truth, justice, freedom, equality, solidarity, and peace? The implications of a post-human critique must be reexamined in light of contemporary global challenges, including the renewal of democratic institutions, the protection of universal human rights, and the pursuit of sustainable development. Engaging with, and perhaps also moving beyond, Foucault's concepts and methodologies, we aim to better understand our historical condition-one in which the apparent farewell to "humanity" and "human nature" coexists with both the proliferation of nihilisms and the unexpected revival of plural humanisms animated by distinct philosophical stances, including the Enlightenment ideal of the public use of critical reason. We welcome proposals for individual papers and panel sessions that address Foucault's philosophical anthropology (or lack thereof) across the full span of his intellectual trajectory. Topics may include, for example, Foucault's engagements with psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and existential psychology, as well as his readings of Stoicism, Kant, Marx, This conference is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT-Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UIDB/FIL/00310/2020. 2 and Nietzsche. The conference seeks to offer an interdisciplinary forum for exploring Foucault's diverse "views of man" from multiple perspectives-ethical, aesthetic, political, legal, educational, medical, psychiatric, or criminological-employing his key methodological tools (notably archaeology and genealogy), while remaining open to innovative reinterpretations.

The centenary of Michel Foucault's birth offers a timely opportunity to reassess the profound contribution of his philosophy to our understanding of human subjectivity in the interwoven contexts of knowledge, power, ethics, and aesthetics, as these unfold throughout history, culture, and society. Inspired by Foucault's oeuvre and its diverse legacies, this conference invites reflection on a fundamental question: What is-and what can become of-humanity after the "death of man"? How does this notion relate to the "death of God," the rise of biopolitics, and the ongoing

In this study, Immanuel Kant's work titled On Education (Über Pädagogik), written in the late 18th century, is analyzed in detail in the context of the Enlightenment in terms of child education, parental responsibilities, and the transmission of religious and moral values. It can be said that the work reflects the social, cultural, and moral values of the period and contains important observations about the roles of educators, administrators, and parents in child rearing. The main purpose of the study is to examine the understanding of child education in the Enlightenment period, when the foundations of modern pedagogy were laid, from a historical perspective and to shed light on the origins of modern approaches. In his work, Kant describes the responsibilities of educational institutions and parents towards children and emphasizes the importance of physical, moral, and religious education. When the work is examined, it is seen that despite the changing family structure, socioeconomic conditions, educational policies, and many other current issues, some of the fundamental values regarding child education and parental responsibilities remain constant. The work, which serves as a bridge between past and present pedagogical approaches, is thought to contribute to understanding the historical development and fundamental dynamics of modern child-rearing concepts. Additionally, Kant's educational philosophy aligns with many aspects of modern educational theories and highlights the importance of education for humanity's shared future; in this context, the work can be considered a valuable resource for researchers, educators, and academics working in the field of child upbringing and education.

El presente artículo tiene como objeto de estudio la pobreza económica a partir del pensamiento moral de Immanuel Kant. Para tal propósito, se analizan elementos de su moral pura a priori y su moral impura a priori o ética material, con el objetivo de matizar el supuesto formalismo kantiano y demostrar que la necesidad de los más necesitados no es ajena a la propuesta moral kantiana. Este abordaje aporta nuevos elementos, que obligan a repensar la tesis según la cual la moral kantiana consiste únicamente en una moral del deber por el deber, una moral desencarnada que, por tanto, se muestra del todo ajena a nuestras particularidades. En esta configuración, conceptos como los de dignidad, deber de beneficencia, deber de simpatía, creatividad moral y ética material, hacen cada vez más visible la necesidad de indagar sobre una moral kantiana que oriente frente a problemas que aquejan gravemente a la humanidad.

This article examines the relationship between Kant’s general theory of decision-making and moral judgment. The initial thesis is that Kant’s theory relies heavily on common sense. For the analysis of common-sense practical judgment, Kant employs technical terms such as “maxim,” “hypothetical imperative,” and “categorical imperative,” which the author seeks to elucidate. In concluding remarks, the author points out that Kant’s “categorical imperative” in everyday moral judgment manifests itself in direct insights into immediate duties.

KEYWORDS: common sense, maxim, hypothetical imperative, categorical imperative, duty

The doctrine of the highest good has given rise to numerous controversies. Indeed, several divergent interpretations have emerged in the more recent literature. Among these interpretations, one school of thought-which I will call the transcendent interpretationholds that the highest good should be understood from an individual, transcendent, and religious perspective that emphasizes the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. A competing interpretation-which I will call the immanent interpretation-maintains that the doctrine of the highest good should be interpreted from a collective and immanent perspective, attributing a central role to the historical and political dimension. According to this line of interpretation, the emphasis placed on the concept of the "highest good in the world" in Kant's writings of the 1790s marks a shift in perspective, in which the transcendent position of the previous decade would have been abandoned by Kant in favor of an immanent outlook. My aim is to present, in general terms, the state of the debate. I argue that, in the 1790s, Kant adopts an immanent perspective on the highest good, but does not abandon its transcendent dimension. I maintain that, from a systematic point of view, the immanent perspective is problematic and, therefore, the transcendent perspective must continue to be considered the foundation of the doctrine of the highest good.

Anício Mânlio Torquato Severino Boécio (c. 480 – 524 d.C.) foi um filósofo, teólogo e estadista romano, considerado um dos últimos grandes pensadores do mundo antigo e um elo importante entre a filosofia clássica e a escolástica medieval. Nascido em uma família patrícia romana cristã, Boécio teve uma formação profunda tanto na cultura greco-romana quanto na fé cristã. Ocupou altos cargos no governo do rei ostrogodo Teodorico, mas foi acusado de traição e, após ser preso, acabou executado por ordem do rei.

        Durante seu período de prisão, Boécio escreveu sua obra mais famosa, Consolações da Filosofia (De Consolatione Philosophiae), uma meditação em prosa e verso na qual dialoga com a personificação da Filosofia sobre a fragilidade da fortuna, a natureza do bem, da felicidade e da providência divina.

      A obra teve enorme impacto na Idade Média e foi um dos livros mais lidos e comentados durante séculos. Traduzida para várias línguas (inclusive por Alfredo, o Grande e por Jean de Meun), serviu de ponte entre a filosofia pagã (especialmente Platão e Aristóteles) e a teologia cristã, influenciando pensadores como Tomás de Aquino, Dante Alighieri e Boécio de Dácia. Apesar de escrita por um cristão, a obra não faz menções explícitas à fé cristã, o que contribuiu para sua recepção tanto entre leitores cristãos quanto entre pagãos.

    Em suma, Consolações da Filosofia foi fundamental para a preservação do pensamento clássico no Ocidente e desempenhou papel central na formação da filosofia medieval.

Através da hipérbole do povo de demônios, Kant mostra como o direito tem o poder de neutralizar o egoísmo desde o ponto de vista da ação exterior e constituir assim um estado civil. No entanto, este corresponde a um estado de natureza ética, revelando assim que a comunidade jurídica pode ser constituída sem que seja eliminado o mal radical. Dessa forma, o direito é moral sem no entanto ser ético.  Through the hyperbole of the people of devils Kant shows how right has the power to neutralize selfishness from the point of view of external action and thereby constitute a civil state. However, this state corresponds to a state of natural ethics, revealing that a juridical community can be formed withour eliminating radical evil. Therefore, right is moral without being ethical

Kant is usually considered a cold moralist who does not give any importance to feeling and emotions. In this paper I show that Kant has a place for love although he uses this word in different meanings through his work. I will analyze the use and meaning of five different uses of the term love: self-love, practical love, love as affect, love as passion, and sexual love. I show that Kant has a place for love in his theory, in a plurality of shades and meanings, going from the practical love to romantic love. Some of their expressions are meaningful for the moral life, such as practical love, some are not. Kant portrait romantic love as a silly affect, sometimes as a dangerous passion who can even call for medication. And about sex, he claims that it is nothing but the use of the other as a means, which may obtain a higher juridical status if this use is reciprocal, in the case of marriage.

The following essay discusses the strong links between the ideas
of human dignity and that of inalienable and universal human
rights, as established in European cultural history since the
Enlightenment. This juxtaposition provides the foundation to
engage with the accusations of discrimination and racism
leveled against statements made by Rudolf Steiner, to be found
in his work including the thousands of lectures for which
written records exist. The occasion for doing so is a historical
study commissioned by the German and international Demeter
organizations, in cooperation with the Section for Agriculture
of the General Anthroposophical Society, on biodynamic
agriculture’s role in the Nazi period. The essay presented here
aims to present complementary and additional considerations.
These considerations begin with the humanistic idea of ethical
universalism, as it developed out of the European
Enlightenment, with a special focus on the contributions of
Immanuel Kant.

This paper presented a socio-ontological conception of community from the perspective of Igbo thought. It argued that the concept 'community' expresses the Igbo experience of life and what reality is, to the extent that to be is to be in, with, for, by, of and through a 'community'. In exploring the significance of the concept of community in traditional Igbo ontology, the paper highlighted the transcendental dimension of community with the investigation of the connection between earthly community and the community that exists in the hereafter. It made a contribution to literature on such discourse by shedding new light on the Igbo concept of 'community' and its expression as 'communalism' by which the Igbo is identified. It adopted the method of philosophical analysis.

A partire dal XVII secolo, il problema filosofico della libertà è stato affrontato a partire da una visione per cui l’atto libero entra in concorrenza con le catene causali che si pensa regolino in modo stretto gli eventi fisici. In qualunque modo questo schema viene declinato sembra sempre che il soggetto libero sia o impossibile o vada pensato come una riedizione del motore immobile aristotelico. Questa alternativa è davvero senza uscita?
È un luogo comune della storia della scienza che, con la Rivoluzione scientifica, la complessa teoria delle cause formulata da Aristotele sia stata ridotta alla sola causa efficiente.
Il problema della libertà ci fa però dubitare che la sola causalità efficiente ci offra una visione del mondo sufficientemente articolata da poter spiegare aspetti della nostra esperienza che sentiamo essere irrinunciabili. Possiamo recuperare qualcosa della ricchezza della teoria aristotelica delle cause e applicarla a questa problematica con qualche guadagno teoretico?

Como es sabido, "Gemüt" se podría traducir al castellano entre otras opciones por "espíritu", "ánimo", "alma", aunque ninguno de estos términos recoge enteramente todos los matices que tiene el término en alemán. A esta dificultad se suma además el peculiar uso que Kant hace de él, en el que muchas veces aparece como un término técnico (que remite al latín animus y que apunta a algo así como la disposición general del espíritu). Sobre esto, como bien señala Falduto, puede verse la respuesta a Sömmering, AA, 12,

This paper argues that Kant's philosophy entails a normative concept of social rationality distinct from other normative concepts such as moral and juridical rationality. I also argue that the normative demands of social rationality are embodied in the regulative idea of enlightenment which implies a profound intersubjective and moral character that unfolds in multiple layers and perspectives.

The anxious over-reaction against psychologism hast still shaped Dieter Henrich's early interpretation of the proof-structure of the transcendental deduction of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. From this over-reaction against psychologism, the role of the concept of synthesis and the role it plays in the transcendental deduction of categories is underestimated. This underestimation of the concept of synthesis obscures the proof structure of the transcendental deduction.

In this paper, I analyze the concept of passions in Kant, trying to answer the question: are passions good for society or are they the source of evil and irrationality? I begin by showing the danger of passions, if compared with affects. In the Anthropology, as well in the Religion, Kant claims that passions are the evil we should fight against. More than inclinations, or affects, the evil principle refers to passions. However, in the Ideia for an Universal history with a cosmopolitan aim, Kant admits that passions are good for society. They are not the cause of their irrationality, but the possibility of the development of the natural predispositions of human being. I claim that we have two distinct answers in Kant, and I try to understand this ambiguity.

Rawls regarded the priority of the right over the good as the characteristic feature of Kantian constructivism. I have four goals in the paper. First, I try to refute Rawls's reading of Kant on the relation between the right and the good. Second, I fill out Kant's picture of the rational natures that have intrinsic value: They have the law of duty within, are predisposed to respect themselves and others who have the law of duty within, and belong to a community of rational natures. Third, I argue that because Kant thought that the right and the good were coeval, he is not a constructivist, but a kind of realist. Finally, I use my examination of the good, the intrinsically valuable in Kant, to reject any temptation to regard his ethics as dependent on his teleological claim that human nature is the end of nature.

There are many ways to conceptualize state legitimacy, one approach being through the lens of human rights. While thinking of state legitimacy in terms of human rights gained prominence after the Second World War, Johann Benjamin Erhard had already compiled a list of human rights in his 1795 moral justification of revolution, positing that a state's legitimacy in exercising coercion hinges on its ability to secure these rights. In this chapter, I shall argue that Erhard's human rights account is novel in two significant respects. First, from a historical viewpoint, I argue that by placing humanity at the forefront of his philosophy, Erhard-alongside other revolutionary Kantians-presented a novel approach to state legitimacy that was notably unconventional before the 1790s. Second, from a systematic point of view, I shall show that Erhard's innovative use of the Kantian distinction between humanitygrounding duties "in themselves" and "in relation to an end" paves the way for a "critical" usage of human rights to identify existing oppressive structures. Highlighting this aspect will support a recently made suggestion to consider him a "proto-critical theorist.

Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770 Critique of Pure Reason Theoretical Philosophy After 1781 Practical Philosophy Critique of the Power of Judgment Religion and Rational Theology Anthropology, History, and Education Natural Science Lectures on Logic Lectures on Metaphysics Lectures on Ethics Lectures on Anthropology Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy Opus postumum Notes and Fragments Correspondence

The concept of the “Kingdom of God” appears in the philosophy of Sergey (Sergius) Iosifovitch Hessen (1887–1950) in the late period of his work, in 1928, and in the mid-1930s became the most important element in his doctrine of the four planes of being. Paying attention to certain aspects of this doctrine, researchers of Hessen's philosophy have not studied its place in the philosophy of the thinker. Meanwhile, it is the determination of the place of this doctrine that makes it possible to assess the significance of the concept of the Kingdom of God for Hessen. In the given study, the analysis of the doctrine of the four planes of being allows us to consider it as an organic component of Hessen's philosophy. The research hypothesis is that the doctrine of the four planes of being embraced the most important ideas of Hessen, formed during his creative life, into a generalized philosophical system that offers an answer to the questions about the meaning of human life and the meaning of human history. The Kingdom of God in Hessen's philosophical system is the most important concept that allows him to link pedagogical, socio-philosophical, and legal ideas in a unified view of the sociocultural process without contradictions. To confirm the research theses, the most important ideas of Hessen, formed before the actualization of the concept of the Kingdom of God in his own philosophy, are considered, his conceptual apparatus is analyzed to show how Hessen, without abandoning them, adds to them the concept of the Kingdom of God. In Hessen's philosophy, the Kingdom of God is a transcendent ideal, which is fundamentally unrealizable in the earthly temporal existence of mankind. It allows Hessen to combine in his own doctrine the freedom of man with the definition of the goal of the historical development of society, avoiding sociological nominalism and universalism. Hessen's philosophical path, viewed through the prism of the doctrine of the four planes of being, represents a systematic deepening of views in the substantiation of the sociocultural process. This article allows us to understand Hessen's final philosophical intent, his final justification of the meaning of human history.

Usualmente se piensa que el amor incondicional es exclusivo de la relación entre la
madre y el hijo, por la dependencia del objeto de amor. Sin embargo, el amor no
es un objeto que esté fuera nuestro sino que es una capacidad inmanente de confiar y que debe ser ejercida. La razón por la que esta evidencia ha sido olvidada es
porque se piensa que las emociones son irracionales y no pueden ser controladas.
Kant propone que las emociones sean consecuencia de la aplicación de principios
y no que estos gobiernen nuestros actos.
Esta capacidad es consustancial al ser humano y eso se demuestra con un mito
greco-romano “La metamorfosis (el asno de oro)” de Apuleyo, que será analizado
desde los imperativos kantianos que deben superar la contingencia histórica y demostrar universalidad en contraste con la correspondencia entre Kant y la filósofa
kantiana Mari von Herbert sobre la decepción amorosa.

This article reconstructs the principal moments of Dieter Henrich's work on Immanuel Kant's theoretical philosophy. Henrich seeks to clarify and regain the fundaments of Kant's theory of knowledge -from which his followers, according to him, have distanced themselves -based on the analysis of the "transcendental deduction of the categories". Firstly, Henrich investigates the proof structure of deduction, comparing the first and the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason. Secondly, he investigates, in the Kantian argument, the relationship between the identity principle of self-consciousness and objectivity. Finally, extending the comparison to Critique of Practical Reason, Henrich elucidates the program and methodology in deduction, showing that the idea of a legitimating fact, borrowed from the juridical notion of a deduction, becomes the fundamental element. We analyse the problems raised by the conception of a philosophical argument based on fundamental "facts".

In the Groundwork, we find three distinct conceptions of freedom: (i) A negative conception of freedom, understood as a capacity for spontaneous action independent of alien causes; (ii) a positive conception of freedom, understood as the capacity of giving law to oneself; and (iii) a second positive conception, understood as the capacity to give laws that bind others as well as oneself. The dominant interpretation of Kant ignores this third conception of freedom and interprets the second conception as a capacity for self-determination or self-governance, which is seen as the most basic and important Kantian conception of autonomy. In this paper, we will focus mainly on explaining the distinction between the second and third conceptions of autonomy and will defend the claim that the third conception is morally the most basic. We will also explain briefly why Kant thinks that having the capacity for citizenship is necessary for having the capacity for self-governance.

This analysis aims to problematize the concepts of 'character' and 'will,' developing a comparison between Kant's and James's perspectives by examining their function and definition according to each author, with the objective of pinpointing specific differences and, more specifically, seeking some correspondence from James toward Kant's view. To this end, specific sections from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1785) and The Varieties of Religious Experience (William James, 1902) will be considered. The primary question that problematizes this relationship is: Why does James, in a book about spirituality, choose to use the concepts of 'character' and 'will' in lectures XIV and XV, which address 'The Value of Saintliness'? And why use such complex terms instead of simply using the concept of 'soul'? In my opinion, the concept of 'soul' would be more in line with the development of his book.

Kant's account of moral autocracy as the strength of will to impose inner self-constraint is usually interpreted as being strengthened and promoted by the pursuit of the obligatory ends of perfection and holiness. In this context, moral autocracy is seen as something that can be achieved through one's self-activity guided and encouraged by the ideals of perfection and holiness. In this paper, I argue that, in addition to the moral ends of perfection and holiness, moral autocracy also requires moral belief or faith as a guide to achieve a lifestyle that is peculiar to the highest good, i.e. a life conduct that is well-pleasing to God. In view of this, I argue that moral autocracy in conjunction with moral belief or faith leads to a morally pure and refined way of living directed towards the purity of the moral law. Finally, I conclude that the morally refined and elevated form of lifestyle achieved by morally autocratic activity opens the ground for happiness that does not only refer to the satisfaction of one's needs and desires but is also inclusive of the elements of enduring contentment, well-being, and bliss, which leads me to interpret Kant's account of happiness as encapsulating a eudaimonistic dimension in it.

Eric Matthews. p. cm.-(The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-34447-6 1. Judgement (Logic)-Early works to 1800. 2. Judgement (Aesthetics)-Early works to 1800. 4. Teleology-Early works to 1800.