Weight Formula

aplicable siempre que la emanación de una norma (general o individual) da lugar a un conflicto entre normas superiores. En otras palabras, en la medida en que una norma que instancie dos normas superiores incompatibles comprende esa relación de «medio → fin» (la norma superior insatisfecha es el medio para el fin que es satisfacer la norma incompatible), la proporcionalidad es siempre accionada cuando el sistema conduce el agente a una ponderación 3 . (iii) una autoridad normativa emite la norma N3 (norma legislativa) cuyo contenido es el significado de «las estaciones de televisión no podrán emitir reportajes en que se difunda la imagen de un condenado, de manera a que se identifique a la persona, que ya haya cumplido la totalidad de su condena». (iv) N3 instancia N1 (norma constitucional que confiere la «libertad de prensa») y N2 (norma constitucional que confiere el «derecho a la imagen»); N3 comprende una relación de «medio → fin»: la satisfacción del «derecho a la imagen» (fin) ocurre por vía de la insatisfacción de la «libertad de prensa» (medio). La ocurrencia de un escenario normativo en que una norma crea un conflicto en el plano superior, porque comprende tal relación de «medio → fin», también invoca las consecuencias de proporcionalidad que no son específicamente pertinentes para la ponderación. Esto es lo que sucede con las consecuencias de adecuación y de necesidad 4 . La primera es la que establece que los medios deben ser adecuados al fin: es desproporcional, entonces, el contenido normativo que no logra en modo alguno satisfacer la norma superior que visa promover. Lo mismo ocurre con la necesidad: el contenido normativo que no expresa el mejor «ratio» de pérdidas y ganancias (en N1 y N2) es innecesario en comparación con otros contenidos posibles; o sea, es desproporcional 5 . (v) N3 es una norma adecuada, cumpliendo la primera consecuencia de proporcionalidad, si es un medio adecuado para su finalidad (proteger el «derecho a la imagen»); la adecuación de N3 no tiene nada que ver con la ponderación: es un mero requisito de aptitud del medio sin reflejo en el conflicto entre N1 y N2. (vi) N3 es una norma necesaria, cumpliendo la segunda consecuencia de proporcionalidad, si no hay alternativa posible, una posible norma N4, con un mejor «ratio» de pérdidas y ganancias en N1 y N2; la necesidad de N3 tampoco tiene nada que ver con el conflicto entre N1 y N2. Sin embargo, la evaluación de la necesidad ya llama la atención para un problema relevante de la proporcionalidad: la medición; eso es, no se puede comparar una norma a introducir en el sistema (N3) con posibles normas alternativas (por ejemplo, N4) sin medir lo que se pierde comparativamente en la norma superior insatisfecha (N1) y lo que se gana en la norma superior a satisfacer (N2) 6 . Admitiendo que estas mediciones son posibles (lo que parece correcto), el problema de la _____ 3 El siguiente ejemplo es una variación del caso Lebach, a utilizar en todo el artículo, pero aquí con la configuración legislativa (norma general) de una de las normas posibles que el juez podría haber formulado allí (norma individual).

The purpose of the study is a comparative legal analysis of approaches to principles and rules in R. Alexy’s dual theory of law. The methodological basis of the study are the following fundamental methods of scientific knowledge: general methods (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, analogy), as well as special methods (comparative-legal and formal-legal). The application of these methods allowed to subject R. Alexy’s theory of law to an in-depth comparative legal study and to reveal the dichotomy of the principles and rules operating in it. The result of the study was the author’s conclusion that weighing formal and material principles is not only possible, but also a necessary process. In addition, it should be mentioned that the dictate of optimization always requires the implementation of a weighing procedure, and that principles in theory are always implemented indirectly through rules. The principles themselves are the subject of optimization, and the dictate of optimiza...

The recent debate between Alexy and Ratti provides an excellent opportunity to discuss proportionality, balancing and their substantive ramifications. In addition to critically analysing this  debate, we take the opportunity to sustain several propositions that challenge the foundational pillars of Alexy’s «principles theory» and Ratti’s criticisms. Among other points, we argue crucially that: (i) proportionality should not be confused with balancing, as the former imposes limits on the discretion of decision-makers while the latter is an intellectual operation employed to solve normative conflicts; (ii) the structural difference between principles and rules lie in the indeterminacy of the regulated action-type, which explains the symptoms that have been correctly identified thus far; and (iii) neither balancing nor proportionality are conceptually linked to principles (just as rules are not to subsumption), though the structure of principles explains why they are mor likely to be involved in conflicts that can only be solved through balancing.

The recent debate between Alexy and Ratti provides an excellent opportunity to discuss proportionality, balancing and their substantive ramifications. In addition to critically analysing this debate, we take the opportunity to sustain several propositions that challenge the foundational pillars of Alexy's «principles theory» and Ratti's criticisms. Among other points, we argue crucially that: (i) proportionality should not be confused with balancing, as the former imposes limits on the discretion of decision-makers while the latter is an intellectual operation employed to solve normative conflicts; (ii) the structural difference between principles and rules lies in the indeterminacy of the regulated action-type, which explains the symptoms that have been correctly identified thus far; and (iii) neither balancing nor proportionality are conceptually linked to principles (just as rules are not to subsumption), though the structure of principles explains why they are more likely to be involved in conflicts that can only be solved through balancing.

现行人格权理论认为，人格权是自然人对自我人格利益享有的权利，与亲属无关；这从法理和逻辑上切断了人格权与身份权的内在联系。由此，不仅使得立法和司法上承认侵害生命权案件中亲属的损害赔偿权的做法与人格权理论相悖，而且也极大地弱化了人身权的理论基础。拒绝承认其他人格侵权案件中亲属的损害赔偿请求权的做法有悖于人性和亲情，因为每个人的人格利益不仅包括自我人格利益，也包括对亲属的人格要素所享有的人格关爱益。以对亲属的人格关爱利益为客体的权利即身份人格权，它与自我人格权一
起构成个人人格权的完整内涵。身份人格权既是人格权的一种，又属于身份权的一类，是人格权和身份权的公因子，为人身权理论构建和亲属损害赔偿请求权提供了依据。承认身份人格权， 是构建科学人身权理论、适应未来社会发展的客观需要，既符合人性和现代法治的基本理念，也符合中华文化传统。

Much has been said about the logical difference between rules and principles, yet few authors have focused on the distinct logical connectives linking the normative conditions of both norms. I intend to demonstrate that principles, unlike rules, are norms whose antecedents are linguistically formulated in a generic fashion, and thus logically described as inclusive disjunctions. This core feature incorporates the relevance criteria of normative antecedents into the world of principles and also explains their aptitude to conflict with opposing norms, namely that their consequents are fulfilled to varying extents more frequently than those of rules. I conclude that the property of genericity should be predicated to the norm antecedent of principles, more precisely to the hypothetical action. This is of paramount importance to explain, in terms of logical implication and exclusion, the expansibility of competing principles, in contrast with the exclusive character of conflicting rules.

Resumen: En este trabajo se analiza la aproximación que Jorge Luis Rodríguez realiza de la clasificación guastiniana de las jerarquías, se critica la forma en que la aborda y se señalan algunos vacíos de la aproximación de J.L. Rodríguez en torno a los conflictos entre derechos. Brevemente, se subrayan algunos puntos destacados de su obra "Teoría analítica del derecho" en el marco del tema tratado en este ensayo.

I. INTRODUCTION Neil Mac Cormick first put forward his thoughts on legal reasoning in a book entitled Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (hereinafter Legal Reasoning). 3 MacCormick's aim in Legal Reasoning was to explain the nature of legal argumentation as it manifests itself in court decisions. 4 He focused on the legal systems of the United Kingdom, specifically English and Scots law, although he suggested that the claims he made about UK law deserve to be tested with respect to other legal systems, at least insofar as they are grounded in more general philosophical • 5 1. Regius Professor of Public Law and the Law of Nature and Nations. 2. Associate Professor in Jurisprudence, Department of Law, Uppsala University (Sweden). I would like to thank Brian Bix for helpful comments on this review. 3. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter, MACCORMICK, LRLTJ. 4. /d. at 7. 5. /d. at 8. 6. /d. at 15. 7. /d. at x.

Three claims are defended here. First, there are no distinct basic operations in the process of the application of law, like balancing and analogy. Second, analogy has two stages: the purely heuristic stage, and the justification-transmitting stage, which can be identified with the process of balancing legal principles. Thus analogy is shown to be partly reducible to balancing. Third, two competing views of analogy-rule-based and factual-are refuted.

The partial reducibility thesis may still be defended, with appeal to Robert Alexy's theory of legal reasoning. One issue with Duarte's criticism of the partial reducibility thesis is its relative neglect of Alexy's insights. Aspects of analogy which may be of importance for any viable theory of analogy in the law are highlighted as well.

La coalición entre derechos fundamentales o principios constitucionales demandan una interpretación por parte del juez constitucional que al aplicar un bien constitucionalmente protegido no implique la paralela eliminación de otro. Con fundamento en la interpretación hecha al artículo segundo de la Constitución por parte de la Corte Constitucional, esta corporación ha elaborado a través de su jurisprudencia el principio de la armonización concreta, que realiza una ponderación de los bienes constitucionales enfrentados en el caso concreto. De modo que al aplicar un bien constitucionalmente protegido por la carta, el/o no implique la correlativa paralela eliminación de otro.

In this paper I analyze argumentation based on legal principles advanced in the justifica tion of legal decisions, explore the criteria for the assess ment of this type of argumentation and relate that to the general theory of law and legal argumentation. Starting from Alexy's principle theory and from the reactions some of his critics I will differentiate between various forms of argumentation based on legal principles.

In this paper I analyze argumentation based on legal principles advanced in the justifica tion of legal decisions, explore the criteria for the assess ment of this type of argumentation and relate that to the general theory of law and legal argumentation. Starting from Alexy's principle theory and from the reactions some of his critics I will differentiate between various forms of argumentation based on legal principles.

Analogical reasoning is as much contested as it is acclaimed as a tool of legal interpretation to ascertain the ideals of the Rule of Law. It is rejected because it would be infinitely malleable or just a form of deduction from rules. It is defended because it is a reasoned elaboration of law, or even the model of all reasoning. Debates between protagonists and antagonists of analogical reasoning ar e often unclear and even fallacious. In this contribution we will discuss four fallacies in this discussion.

In this blogspot I portrayed some of the ideas I worked on in the frame of my PhD thesis, such as the limits of pro homine interpretation and the need to rethink the criteria for the balancing of national and international incorporated rights.

Resumen: Con este trabajo buscamos poner de relieve algunos desafíos que pueden plantearse al modo en que Alexy explica el papel que cumplen los principios formales en la ponderación de los principios materiales. Su propuesta, por un lado, define a los principios formales como aquellos que buscan optimizar la autoridad de las normas debidamente aprobadas y eficaces. Por el otro, le reconoce a los principios formales un papel en la justificación de la variable "fiabilidad epistémica" de las premisas del razonamiento de aplicación/ponderación de los principios materiales. A partir de esto, define al ámbito de competencia discrecional-autoritativo del legislador democrático como aquel que surge fruto de un empate ponderativo o de falta de certeza epistémica sobre las premisas empíricas y normativas que se incorporan a la ponderación. Desarrollada esta propuesta, afirmaremos que ella corre el riesgo de transformarse en una racionalización rígida, artificial y excesivamente refinada.

Exemplary judges are important for legal theory and legal practice. Still the conception of imitation of exempla as analogical reasoning is criticized here. Imitation as character development may well be more important. Thus, there is, at least, it is argued, one kind of exemplary reasoningnamely, imitative reasoning-that is not coextensive with analogical reasoning. Exempla have educational value, help in theorizing about excellence in adjudication, and are pivotal in the evolution of legal culture.

In the twentieth century, the debate over the possibilities and limits of logic in law became particularly acute with the emergence of judicial realism, a philosophical and legal trend that denied the deductive nature of judicial decision-making. This compromised the theory of the judicial syllogism, assuming that a judicial decision could be deduced as a logical consequence from the premises -norms and facts, and generally provoked a sceptical attitude towards logic in law. The subject of the article is the deductive model of the justification of judicial decisions proposed by the outstanding legal philosopher Eugenio Bulygin. The aim of the article is to show Bulygin"s contribution to the improvement of the deductive model of judicial reasoning. The main innovations Bulygin brought to the deductive model of judicial reasoning are: 1) justifying, based on logical analysis and open texture of language theory, the analytical character of the court interpretative sentences; 2) distinguishing the individual and the generic subsumptions, etc. At the same time, the authors conclude that Bulygin"s improved deductive theory is not free from criticism, as the Argentine jurist does not succeed in complete eliminating doubts about the logical deducibility of at least some categories of decisions from general rules.

The Law and Philosophy Library, which has been in existence since 1985, aims to publish cutting edge works in the philosophy of law, and has a special history of publishing books that focus on legal reasoning and argumentation, including those that may involve somewhat formal methodologies. The series has published numerous important books on law and logic, law and artificial intelligence, law and language, and law and rhetoric. While continuing to stress these areas, the series has more recently expanded to include books on the intersection between law and the Continental philosophical tradition, consistent with the traditional openness of the series to books in the Continental jurisprudential tradition. The series is proud of the geographic diversity of its authors, and many have come from Latin America

El trabajo es una propuesta de identificacion y analisis de tres conflictos normativos o antinomias producidas en la aplicacion de reglas contenidas en la ley de entrevista investigativa videograbada. Utilizando herramientas analiticas de la teoria de los conflictos normativos, se describiran antinomias en contextos concretos en los que un juez debera decidir por la preminencia del principio del debido proceso, en su expresion derecho a la prueba, o la del respeto al interes superior del nino. Hecho el analisis, se ofrecen soluciones para preferir un principio u otro, una regla u otra, mediante la consideracion de la edad de la victima, la presencia de dano en ella, su revictimizacion, la reiteracion de delitos motivo del proceso, u otras circunstancias concretas del caso.

Bartosz Brożek* Analogy and Balancing: A Reply to David Duarte he goal of the paper is to reply to David Duarte's critique of the partial reducibility thesis-a claim I defended in one of my books that analogy is partly reducible to the balancing of legal principles. In the irst part of the paper I sketch the framework against which the thesis was formulated, i.e. Robert Alexy's theory of legal reasoning. In the second part I attempt to rebut Duarte's objections, pointing out that they do not take into account the Alexian background of my considerations. Finally, I suggest that some aspects of my theory of analogical reasoning are independent of its theoretical background and may be of value for any conceptualization of analogy in the law.

The starting point of this study is Robert Alexy’s classification of relationships between law and morality. There is one general and one particular reason for using his classification as the study’s starting point. The general justification is that his classification is logical and can serve as a foundation for gaining further insight into the relationships between law and morality. Predominantly, Alexy visited Japan in the past year, and I translated his lecture on “inclusive non-positivisms” 2 from German into Japanese. 3 I believe that the best way to repay him for his generous contribution to Japanese academic society is to engage in critical analysis of his valuable theoretical work and improve on it.

RESUMEN. El presente trabajo constituye un esfuerzo de explicación del fenómeno de la derrotabilidad de las normas jurídicas y de las diferentes formas de interacción entre reglas y principios jurídicos. Tras la adopción de la clasificación de las normas jurídicas propuesta por R. Alexy se espera construir un modelo para explicar la estructura de las decisiones contra legem.

The editors of this collection of essays concede that it does 'not purport to provide an overarching ''solution'' to the complexities faced by the courts when dealing with causation evidence' (p xxxii).Why then does this book make a useful addition to what is an already voluminous literature? First, it pays more than the usual lip-service to the need for an approach which transcends the boundaries of law and science. The editors (both lawyers) set the tone with their willingness to engage with the implications for the courts of uncertainties in the origins of disease. Among the contributions by medical scientists, Peter Greenberg's perhaps reveals the clearest sympathy for lawyers faced with con£icting evidence from rival expert witnesses. Secondly, since most of the contributors practise their respective professions in Australia, the book o¡ers an alternative perspective within a branch of medico-legal studies largely dominated by American scholars. The numerous citations to English, Canadian and US, as well as Australian, case-law con¢rm that the problem of causation transcends jurisdictional boundaries as well as those of academic disciplines.What exactly is this problem? For conventional science, it is justifying the inductive leap from repeated observations of X followingY to a belief in the proposition that 'Ycauses X'. Law is no less preoccupied with what might be termed 'cause in fact' but it is also concerned with the attribution of responsibility.When we state that (1) 'Harold Shipman was responsible for over two hundred untimely deaths', we are making a very di¡erent statement from (2) 'an in£uenza epidemic was responsible for millions of deaths in 1919'. The concept of responsibility carries so many normative overtones that its use in statements like (2) is essentially metaphorical and frustrates a deeper understanding of the moral responsibility at issue when, for example, we choose to drink and drive. As Tony Honore Ł writes: '[c]ausation is an essential tool for holding people responsible for the changes they make in the world' (p 8). Jane Stapleton provocatively claims that 'causation is not a concept at all' (p 14), but her analysis is also concerned with changes (or 'transitions') in the physical world. Science may elucidate the 'myriad of factors' which precede a transition but it cannot identify which of those factors are 'important' in terms of the attribution of legal responsibility. But the courts only get to hear cases in which scientists cannot agree on the factual history of the claimant's condition. Since the courts cannot commission experiments, they ¢ll the 'evidentiary gaps' by attaching importance to those factors which derive from the 'moral and policy goals of the particular rule of obligation' (p 18). The 'negligent sportsmen'paradox is used to illustrate her point: two hunters recklessly and simultaneously ¢re their guns, injuring a third, but forensic science is unable to link the one o¡ending bullet to either gun. The law chooses to overcome the factual lacuna by treating both hunters as responsible for the injury and jointly liable for the damages

El trabajo es una propuesta de identificación y análisis de tres conflictos normativos o antinomias producidas en la aplicación de reglas contenidas en la ley de entrevista investigativa videograbada. Utilizando herramientas analíticas de la teoría de los conflictos normativos, se describirán antinomias en contextos concretos en los que un juez deberá decidir por la preeminencia del principio del debido proceso, en su expresión derecho a la prueba, o la del respeto al interés superior del niño. Hecho el análisis, se ofrecen soluciones para preferir un principio u otro, una regla u otra, mediante la consideración de la edad de la víctima, la presencia de daño en ella, su revictimización, la reiteración de delitos motivo del proceso, u otras circunstancias concretas del caso.

In this paper I analyze argumentation based on legal principles advanced in the justifica tion of legal decisions, explore the criteria for the assess ment of this type of argumentation and relate that to the general theory of law and legal argumentation. Starting from Alexy's principle theory and from the reactions some of his critics I will differentiate between various forms of argumentation based on legal principles.

In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a "special case" of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation. ** * Paper presented at a workshop on "Justification and Application of Rules" at the European University Institute (Florence, March 1992).

The puzzle of defeasible rules At first glance it is hard to know what is meant when someone says: 'Well, that's the exception that proves the rule!' An exception hardly seems supportive of its rule; if anything, the exception seems to quallijr the rule and to take it down a peg. Far from proving the rule, an exception appears to render it less of a rule. Certainly it gives the rule less scope. It may even leave us thinking that the rule could be vulnerable to more * Professor of Law, Universiry ofToromo. 1 A more complete version of the saying, somecimes trotted om to make better sense of ir, is: 'the e.'<cepcion proves the rule so far as matters not excepted' (or in Latin, 'exceptio probat regulam de rebus non exceptis'; see Black's Law Dictionary). But chis version fares only slightly better than the original. 'Matters not excepted' are at best untouched by the exceprions; they are hardly proved by them. Worse, the possibility of further exceptions, even co mau:ers so far nor excepted, is suggested. So the puzzle of proof by way of e.'fception.s remains. 2 For disrussion of essenrially sequenced concepts, see B.

La coalición entre derechos fundamentales o principios constitucionales demandan una interpretación por parte del juez constitucional que al aplicar un bien constitucionalmente protegido no implique la paralela eliminación de otro. Con fundamento en la interpretación hecha al artículo segundo de la Constitución por parte de la Corte Constitucional, esta corporación ha elaborado a través de su jurisprudencia el principio de la armonización concreta, que realiza una ponderación de los bienes constitucionales enfrentados en el caso concreto. De modo que al aplicar un bien constitucionalmente protegido por la carta, el/o no implique la correlativa paralela eliminación de otro.

This article examines Robert Alexy's account of legal validity. It concludes that Alexy's account of legal validity lacks sufficient support given the author's methodological commitments. To reach that conclusion, it assesses the plausibility of simultaneously maintaining that the participant's perspective has conceptual privilege in the explanation of the nature of law, that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, and that unjust considerations can be legally valid norms. * I am grateful to Ricardo Caracciolo and Cristina Redondo for discussing the arguments of this article. I also want to thank the anonymous referee, Jan Sieckmann and Laura Clérico for their criticism and suggestions. 1 For Alexy (1994, 47; 1989a, 171), the observers are those who question how legal matters are decided within the context of a particular legal system.

This Chapter discusses Professor Postema's account of analogy in law. It takes issue with Professor Postema's contention that ‘strictly speaking, there is no such thing as argument from analogy, but only reasoning with analogy, or rather analogical reasoning'. Professor Postema holds the view that analogies appear in ordinary judicial discourse in a simplified form that does not reveal the underlying complexities of analogical reasoning. He contends that analogical reasoning must be uncovered and understood if we are to assess ordinary analogies properly. Professor Postema’s views are evaluated in section III after some preliminary remarks in sections I and II .

Reasoning from case to case not only characterizes the heuristics in common law tradition, but also legal adjudication on the basis of statutory rules. Both the interpretation of rules and the weighing and balancing of principles are directed by the plain cases. They serve as the heuristic starting points in legal reasoning, while the decision ensues from mutual comparison of cases rather than from interpretive strategies.

This paper focuses on legal reasoning, arguing that although methodological theories are important, they are not enough to explain how to reason in law. In fact, because the different philosophical perspectives vary so significantly in their ability to resolve legal conflicts, when a less "adapted" perspective decides a legal question, the results can be disastrous. Thus, this paper inaugurates a new attitude, stating that a general philosophical perspective is the only way out. Relying on a metatheoretical postmodern approach, it argues that logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics are complementary theories that offer a unique perception of law. It concludes that the approach proposed makes possible not only a comprehensive view of the way legal reasoning behaves, but more than this, a proportionate flexibility to both civil and common law systems.

I. Introducción II. El interés superior del niño: su carácter dinámico y flexible III. Las pautas de interpretación y argumentación de la Observación General Nro. 14 del Comité de los Derechos del Niño de Naciones Unidas: 1) La consideración primordial: flexibilidad en su aplicación 2) Evaluación y Determinación 3) Lista enunciativa de elementos de evaluación 4) Equilibrio entre los elementos de la evaluación. La necesidad de analizar las consecuencias de la decisión 5) La Ponderación y el principio de proporcionalidad IV. Una motivación completa para el Interés Superior del Niño V. Los criterios básicos para revisar las decisiones VI. Conclusiones

El presente trabajo constituye un esfuerzo de explicación del fenómeno de la derrotabilidad de las normas jurídicas y de las diferentes formas de interacción entre reglas y principios jurídicos. Tras la adopción de la clasificación de las normas jurídicas propuesta por R. Alexy se espera construir un modelo para explicar la estructura de las decisiones contra legem.

El presente artículo constituye un análisis dialectico y minucioso de los diferentes aspectos criticados por los doctrinantes constitucionales acerca de los modelos de ponderación constitucional. Se revisarán las posiciones conceptuales, metodológicas y normativas, esto con el propósito de disipar las principales dudas que surgen a la hora de aplicar este modelo en un caso concreto, y sobre todo, valorar la complejidad logística de los principios en colisión al resolver un caso particular en un contexto específico, distinto a otro similar desde otro entorno.

El presente artículo se enmarca en la problemática general de la toma de decisiones en su-puestos de empates de ponderación. Si bien para el planteamiento del problema se toma en consideración la teoría de los principios y ponderación ofrecida por Robert Alexy, en la propuesta de solución-mediante tres reglas aplicables a los supuestos de empate-nos alejamos de la propuesta alexyana. Las reglas propuestas buscan ser heurísticas para la solución de casos de empates de ponderación.
Palabras clave: Colisión de principios - empates de ponderación-principio democrático - in dubio pro libertate

Este estudio trata sobre los derechos sociales que se encuentran incorporados al catálogo de derechos fundamentales de las Constituciones. Como es bien sabido, la mayoría de las cláusulas constitucionales que pretenden garantizar derechos sociales están redactadas a través de formulaciones sucintas y con términos ambiguos o excesivamente vagos. Por eso, el interrogante que se plantea es si existe algún procedimiento de argumentación que permita justificar racionalmente su adjudicación judicial. Para responder a esta pregunta el autor partirá del marco teórico proporcionado por la teoría de los principios de Robert Alexy. La hipótesis central del libro es que existen dos grupos de argumentos que permiten fundamentar, como parte del significado de las cláusulas constitucionales, reglas de derecho social que justifican la toma de decisiones jurídicas: el primer grupo está integrado por aquellos argumentos basados en la interpretación del texto constitucional, en el uso de casos precedentes o análogos; el segundo grupo está integrado por aquellos argumentos que pueden ser sistematizados dentro del examen de proporcionalidad por omisión.
Según los autores del prólogo, Laura Clérico y Jan-R. Sieckmann, "son varios los motivos que aconsejan la lectura de este libro: análisis minucioso, reflexión crítica, claridad y riqueza en la argumentación, relevancia práctica, profundidad teórica y originalidad. Se trata de una obra que no solo resulta de importancia para la academia interesada en la teoría y filosofía del derecho, la dogmática constitucional, de derechos humanos y de derecho comparado, sino también para los y las operadores/as jurídicos que se plantean el desafío cotidiano de contribuir al logro del goce efectivo de los derechos sociales".

Legal reasoning is about the creation, application and extinction of legal norms (rules, standards or principles). Legislators and lawmakers argue about the creation and extinction of norms, or, more technically, about the enactment and abrogation of norms by the competent legal authorities. Judges and other officials argue about the application of norms, on the basis of the interpretation of the relevant legal texts. In the judicial context, in particular, participants make arguments about the relevant facts and the application of law to these facts. Legal arguments divide into evidentiary and interpretive ones, where the former point at the reconstruction of what happened and the latter point at the ways in which legal texts can be interpreted. Both are necessary to the application of law.

En este trabajo, sostengo que la teoría de la ponderación de Robert Alexy está afectada por una contradicción básica que la hace inviable como instrumento explicativo de algunos aspectos del derecho y del razonamiento jurídico que presuntamente quiere aclarar. En particular, trato de mostrar que una de las premisas sobre las que se basa dicha teoría resulta incompatible con la conclusión a la cual pretende llegar: la teoría, en efecto, parte de la distinción tajante entre reglas y principios para terminar demostrando (aunque sea implícitamente) que no hay manera de distinguir entre reglas y principios, ya que la fórmula del peso y la ley de colisión anulan toda diferencia entre los distintos tipos de normas.

Los conflictos de competencias son un problema omnipresente en el Derecho. Ellos representan un serio desafío, en particular, al constitucionalismo global y al cosmopolitismo institucional. En este artículo se argumentará desde la perspectiva del participante, siguiendo un enfoque normativo-analítico. Se desarrolla una nueva taxonomía de los conflictos de competencia. En esencia, se defiende una solución jurídica flexible a los conflictos de competencia, inspirada por la idea de concordancia institucional práctica y ofrece un camino intermedio entre las soluciones jurídicas estrictas y las peticiones políticas de diálogo. La autoridad jurídica supraestatal, así como la competencia, admiten grados y variabilidad dependiendo de las circunstancias jurídicas y fácticas de cada caso en cuestión. Este entendimiento es posible al interpretar las competencias como principios formales. A partir de las investigaciones de Alexy y Kumm, se abordará la ponderación de competencias como un método jurídico distinto, utilizando para ello, una escala triádica y varios factores para determinar el peso concreto de una competencia. La teoría de la ponderación de competencias, se ejemplifica en el conflicto de competencias en el sistema multinivel de protección de los derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea. En consecuencia, una teoría universal, pero a la vez sensible para el caso concreto, que combina de manera óptima flexibilidad y estabilidad, permitiendo una comprensión pluralista de la soberanía. Se defenderá así el cosmopolitismo institucional contra el pluralismo escéptico.