Social Ontology

"No artigo de Valdenor Monteiro Brito Júnior é apresentada uma proposta de extensão da área da ontologia social. O autor destaca que as propostas tradicionais de ontologia social, de teorias que buscam explicar a estrutura metafísica do mundo social, são significativamente ancoradas em pressupostos antropocêntricos. Mente e linguagem são os elementos centrais da construção da realidade social para essas teorias e os exemplos paradigmáticos de estados mentais e atos de fala são exclusivamente humanos, i.e., não são instanciados por nenhum outro ser vivo. Na tentativa de ampliar o quadro de entidades sociais legítimas que existem na realidade, Valdenor se utiliza de pesquisas da área da biologia para encontrar critérios mais abrangentes para serem aplicados nas teorias de ontologia social. A aposta se dá a partir do conceito de sociedade, enquanto um grupo de indivíduos pertencentes à mesma espécie e organizados de uma maneira cooperativa, e especificações sobre as causas e tipos de cooperação observadas em diversas espécies. A tese central do texto é baseada no comportamento de animais eussociais (formigas, abelhas, vespas, cupins), onde a estrutura social produzida por essas espécies não poderia ser descartada ou subestimada enquanto instância de entidade pertencente à ontologia social. O autor ainda discute uma série de objeções que buscariam descartar ou subestimar esses exemplos, argumentando que essas estratégias não são satisfatórias para demover a pertença desses casos ao conjunto de entidades sociais legítimas. Desta forma, deveríamos tratar igualmente as instâncias de entidades sociais produzidas por insetos eussociais e primatas humanos, pois ambos satisfazem o critério necessário para a existência de entidades sociais: a presença de certos tipos de comportamentos sujeitos aos princípios relativos à evolução da cooperação." (Extraído da Apresentação, pelos organizadores Anderson Fonseca e Luiz Paulo Cichoski)

[Errata: on page 106, where it is written "conscience" please read "consciousness"] In this paper I shall examine the relationship between the mind-dependence thesis in social ontology and certain thought experiments in philosophy of mind. In the first section, I analyze different phenomena which fall on some concept of ‘mind’ or ‘mental’. I shall argue that the relevant “mental states” for the mind-dependence thesis in social ontology are intentional states. That is, the mind-dependence thesis asserts that social entities ontologically depend on intentional mental states. In the second section, I will discuss why we should expect that differences among philosophical accounts of mind makes a difference for what consequences the mind-dependence thesis has. My aim is to show that the mind-dependence thesis is affected by what the nature of mind is. I use the philosophical zombie thought experiment for demonstrating this theoretical impact. The Searle’s connection principle (linking intentionality and consciousness) or a weaker principle (restricted for collective intentionality or individual intentionality related to social phenomena) can relate this thought experiment in philosophy of mind with the mind-dependence thesis in social ontology, by making meaningful to ask if zombie worlds have social entities. I think there is a non-explored theoretical room for non-mentalistic social ontology. Social ontology can be reconceived by refusing or reformulating the mind-dependence thesis. Given a non-mentalistic social ontology, it is expected that zombie worlds have social entities. What seems to be problematic i​n​ in a mentalistic social ontology is made intelligible by dropping the mind-dependence thesis (in its standard formulation). However, the zombie thought experiment makes the point against the mind-dependence thesis given very specific conditions. That is, someone needs to accept that the zombie world is metaphysically possible and to accept the Searle’s connection principle or a similar although weaker principle concerning collective intentionality or individual intentionality related to social phenomena. Both are controversial assertions. And it means that this style of argument works only for the dualist about consciousness. However, that is exactly what I wanted to discuss in this paper. Someone’s theory of mind affects what the mind-dependence thesis does at the theoretical landscape. Arguments against mind-dependence thesis for physicalists must use zombie thought experiments acceptable from a physicalist perspective (e.g. Dretske’s zombie, behavioral zombies, and so on), a possibility I intend to explore in a future paper.

Na ontologia social contemporânea, é disseminada a tese da dependência da mente das entidades sociais, isto é, a tese de que entidades sociais, tais como o dinheiro ou o Direito, dependem ontologicamente do mental. Por “mente” designa-se os estados mentais dos indivíduos que compõem a sociedade, considerados conjuntamente. Contudo, caso admitamos a possibilidade de que grupos possuam cognição e, nesse sentido, estados mentais, esse mental respectivo aos grupos sociais poderia sustentar ontologicamente as entidades sociais? O objetivo desse artigo é elucidar essa questão. Em primeiro lugar, articula-se o desafio de que o mental de grupo não poderia sustentar as entidades sociais, dado que nem todos os grupos possuiriam mentes no sentido relevante, ou o teriam de forma apenas intermitente, de modo que não seríamos capazes de identificar um grupo social com cognição própria para a dependência de cada entidade social. Contudo, é proposta uma resposta a esse desafio: distinguindo entre três tipos de entidades sociais, é apenas um destes tipos que poderia ser entendido como dependente do mental de grupo, correspondendo àquelas que pressupõem instituições permanentes mais complexas na sociedade.

O objetivo do presente capítulo é discutir nossas intuições filosóficas a respeito da dependência ontológica da obra de arte em relação à mente, por especial atenção ao caso da pintura e tendo como referência o trabalho de Amie Thomasson. Em primeiro lugar, descrevo a abordagem de Amie Thomasson para a ontologia da obra de arte em geral e das obras de pintura em particular. Sua abordagem se compromete com uma tese de dependência da mente para as obras de arte: dependência ontológica histórica e rígida das obras de arte em relação aos estados mentais intencionais de seus criadores/produtores (produzidas intencionalmente) e dependência ontológica constante e genérica das obras de arte em relação a estados mentais intencionais de seres humanos quaisquer (ao menos dentro de dada(s) sociedade(s) em que as obras de arte estejam inseridas). Em segundo lugar, faço uma crítica à tese da dependência da mente na ontologia da arte como encontrada em Amie Thomasson, por referência especificamente ao caso das obras de pintura. Thomasson não motiva suficientemente que obras de pintura requeiram estados mentais intencionais para existirem (seja em termos de dependência ontológica constante, seja em termos de dependência ontológica histórica). Para contrapor esse quadro, desenvolvo como uma abordagem comportamental ou agentiva para as obras de pintura justificaria a mesma dependência ontológica constante e genérica, e a mesma dependência ontológica histórica e rígida, defendida por Thomasson para a obra de arte, mas sem que as obras de pintura sejam dependentes da mente. Assim, é possível concluir que a tese da dependência da mente para a ontologia das pinturas não é a única forma possível de pensar a dependência ontológica dessas entidades, devendo ser levada a sério a possibilidade teórica de uma ontologia não-mentalista para a obra de arte.

Die Arbeit untersucht das Bedürfnis nach Nähe als zentrales Element menschlicher Existenz. Auf Basis psychologischer, sozialwissenschaftlicher und philosophischer Ansätze wird die Bedeutung von Bindung, Empathie und authentischer Begegnung analysiert. Dabei werden sowohl biologische Grundlagen als auch gesellschaftliche Veränderungen der Moderne berücksichtigt. Abschließend werden praxisnahe Wege vorgestellt, wie Nähe im Alltag wiedererlangt und vertieft werden kann.

This paper explores the human longing for closeness as a fundamental aspect of exis-tence. Drawing on psychological, social, and philosophical perspectives, it analyzes the role of attachment, empathy, and authentic encounter. Both biological foundations and the challenges of modern society are discussed. Finally, practical approaches to cultivating genuine connection in everyday life are presented. Methodologically, the study follows a hermeneutic-analytical approach that integrates theoretical reflection with interpretive discourse analysis.

This essay presents and then critiques John Searle’s social ontology. First, it summarizes Searle’s earlier concepts of intentionality and declarations, which he asserts as essential to his project of describing the structure of social existence. Next, the essay reproduces in reduced but substantially faithful form Searle’s general theory of institutions and institutional facts from his accounts of collective intentionality, language, and social reality. Third, it makes some general observations and critique of Searle’s theory. Fourth, the essay then engages Searle on the application of his social ontology on the issues of freedom (and rationality), power, and rights through Slavoj Zizek’s concept of ideology, Michel Foucault’s notion of power, and Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben’s arguments on violence and the exception. Finally, the essay concludes that although Searle suggests that the destruction of the unjust structures of society is possible through the creation of an intransigent and inconsistent form of collective intentionality, his social ontology is irrelevant in the thought and practice of this militant venture.

This comprehensive paper presents the complete CosmArachne framework-an original metaphysical model that conceptualizes the universe as a dynamic, self-producing network of relational knots. Derived from Greek "kosmos" (universe) and "Arachne" (spider), the model transcends classical mechanistic paradigms by proposing a holistic, relational ontology where consciousness emerges as both product and participatory agent in cosmic production. The work systematically develops seven interconnected dimensions: (1) Fundamental network ontology of threads and knots; (2) Meta-evolution through networked resonance; (3) Process philosophy and intentional production; (4) Life as specialized nodal capture; (5) Cosmic consciousness and immanent divinity; (6) Hub theory and fractal cosmology with Ontological Depth Constant; (7) Quantum entanglement as network-time resonance. We establish mathematical formalisms using multi-layer network theory, spectral graph analysis, topological data analysis, and synchronization dynamics, providing testable predictions across cosmological, biological, and quantum domains. The framework integrates insights from Leibniz, Whitehead, process philosophy, and contemporary network science while offering novel resolutions to perennial philosophical problems including infinite regress, the hard problem of consciousness, and quantum non-locality.

This comprehensive paper presents the complete CosmArachne framework -an original metaphysical model that conceptualizes the universe as a dynamic, self-producing network of relational knots. Derived from Greek "kosmos" (universe) and "Arachne" (spider), the model transcends classical mechanistic paradigms by proposing a holistic, relational ontology where consciousness emerges as both product and participatory agent in cosmic production. The work systematically develops seven interconnected dimensions: (1) Fundamental network ontology of threads and knots; (2) Meta-evolution through networked resonance; (3) Process philosophy and intentional production; (4) Life as specialized nodal capture; (5) Cosmic consciousness and immanent divinity; (6) Hub theory and fractal cosmology with Ontological Depth Constant; ( ) Quantum entanglement as network-time resonance. We establish mathematical formalisms using multi-layer network theory, spectral graph analysis, topological data analysis, and synchronization dynamics, providing testable predictions across cosmological, biological, and quantum domains. The framework integrates insights from Leibniz, Whitehead, process philosophy, and contemporary network science while offering novel resolutions to perennial philosophical problems including infinite regress, the hard problem of consciousness, and quantum non-locality.

Müasir hüquq sistemi uzun illərdir ki, bir çox yeniliklərlə üz-üzə qalmışdır. Bu yeni trendlərdən biri də süni intellekt sistemləri və onların hüquqi fəaliyyətə təsirindən ibarətdir. Heç şübhə yoxdur ki, hər bir yenilik kimi, süni intellekt də özü ilə bərabər həm müsbət, həm də mənfi bir çox təsirləri gətirir. İstənilən halda, dəyişən dünyanın və texnoloji yeniliklərin işığında innovativ vasitələrin qiymətləndirilməsi və onların sahib olduğu potensialdan maksimal dərəcədə istifadə edilməsi hüquq elmi üçün kifayət qədər vacibdir. Bu baxımdan, süni intelletkin hüquq elminə təsirlərini anlamaq, həmçinin süni intellekt əsaslı sistemlərin hüquqi fəaliyyətlə qarşılıqlı əlaqəsini dərindən mənimsəmək üçün onun hüquqi təbiətinin müəyyən edilməsi və vahid yanaşmanın formalaşdırılması zəruridir. Bu tədqiqat işi süni intellektin hüquqi təbiətini müəyyən etməyə cəhd edir və vahid yanaşmanın formalaşdırılmasında üzləşilən potensial çətinlikləri analiz edir. Bu məqsədlə müəllif beynəlxalq təcrübəni və bir sıra inkişaf etmiş ölkələrin qanunvericilik faəliyyətini araşdıraraq doktrinal təhlil aparır, mümkün hüquqi tərifin müsbət və mənfi tərəflərini müqayisə edir və son nəticədə, süni intellektə vahid yanaşma təqdim edərək balanslı tənzimləmə metodunun zəruriliyini əsaslandırır.

The aim of this paper is to distinguish some varieties of what I call 'comparison argumentation.' This way of arguing consists of supporting a claim about one thing on the basis of a comparison of that thing with another. The criteria that I use are the subject, the degree, and the purpose of the comparison. I do not intend to be exhaustive, but to address two specific questions: what sets arguments by analogy apart within this category and, from there, how they can be evaluated based on their distinctive features. An important aspect of my approach is the analysis of cases. I have selected a relatively large corpus of examples, mainly from the news media, and will analyse them based on argumentative connectors and other conventional indicators of comparisons.

Cet article se propose d’explorer les croisements entre l’anthropologie et la sémiotique à travers une enquête sur les savoirs sensibles à Maarja Küla en Estonie, un foyer de vie pour les personnes neurodivergentes. Partant des théories qui situent le corps dans son milieu, comme devenir sa pratique de Tim Ingold, l’Umwelt de Jakob von Uexküll, la théorie d’affordances de James J. Gibson ou le savoir tacite de Michael Polanyi, je m’attache à les considérer en tant que manières d’accorder de l’attention sur le terrain aux activités sémiotiques non symboliques. Je convoque également la sémiotique de Charles S. Peirce dans l’anthropologie au-delà de l’humain d’Eduardo Kohn, ainsi que les controverses liées à son usage en tant que cadre conceptuel appliqué sur le terrain. Je fais appel aux signes non symboliques mis en lumière par Peirce pour fabriquer un dispositif de l’enquête avec les participant·e·s à mes ateliers à Maarja Küla : déclencher une activité iconique et indicielle par une pratique artistique. Pendant les exercices de bruitage, par exemple, nous enregistrons des effets sonores reproduits avec des objets du quotidien ou réalisés par nos propres corps afin de recréer la bande sonore de films documentaires animaliers. Les performances qui en résultent activent le savoir sensible sur d’autres êtres vivants.

Kann die französische Philosophie der Gegenwart dem hegelianischen Denken wirklich entkommen? Die Studie extrahiert eine kritisch-humanistische Version des Hegelianismus aus der französischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Dieser entsprechend steht in der Entwicklung vom französischen Hegelianismus, der von Kojève ausgelöst wird und in Sartre kulminiert, zum von Lévinas vertretenen Anti-Hegelianismus die Frage des Anderen stets im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion. Alle drei Denker liefern Modelle des Anderen: das vollständig symmetrische Modell des Begehrens, das quasi-symmetrische Modell des Blicks und das asymmetrische ethische Modell. Kann das asymmetrische Modell von Lévinas vollständig ohne das symmetrische Anerkennungsmodell Hegels, das von Kojève und Sartre betont wird, auskommen? Besteht eine Komplizenschaft zwischen dem von Kojève und Sartre vertretenen französischen Hegelianismus und dem von Lévinas vertretenen Anti-Hegelianismus? Wie sieht die Zukunft des französischen Hegelianismus aus?

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman's project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman's claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggests that these forms of power share the same basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power specifically helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we argue that Burman's arguments for the conclusion that telic power can exist without deontic power are unsuccessful. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions as sets of constitutive rules, which are-in her opinion-the source of deontic power. Burman's arguments are not successful because she disregards the plausible view that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a collective recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, a recognition of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require recognition of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is particularly useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that Burman has not fully clarified the relation between teleological normativity and the forms of telic power and requires a deeper analysis.

What is a layer? A separator or something separated? Is there such a thing as a layer or is it a different concept, or rather object, depending on the discipline? There are two philosophical questions regarding the layer: Does it exist? (ontology) and What is it? (metaphysics).

Fifteen years after the publication of G. Braddock's paper "Epicureanism, death, and the good life" in Philosophical inquiry the time has come to think of what actually prevents Epicureanism from taking root in Western societies, thereby facilitating our relationship with disease and care: hypochondria. In this commentary I analyse the philosophical problem of hypochondria overturning Heidegger's idea that awareness of death is positive and calling for medical therapies that, through the help of psychology, would act on the causes and elimination of hypochondria.

John Searle died last month. This document contains summaries of Searle on the is-ought gap, his famous Chinese room thought experiment, his debate with Derrida, and his work on the social construction of reality. I hope this summary can be forgiven.

لماذا لم يكتشف العلم الاجتماعي المعاصر الذي نشأ على مدار 200 سنة قوانين المجتمع الحديث وآليات تنظيمه الأقوم؟ هل المشكلة هي في النموذج المعرفي الأساسي المسمى الوضعية؟ هل الهشاشة المتفاقمة للمجتمعات المعاصرة (وهو ما أطلق عليه فوكوياما بالتصدع العظيم) منذ الأزمة المالية والاقتصادية العالمية (2008) مروراً بتداعيات كارثة كورونا (2020) وانتهاء بهيمنة القومية والشعوبية على مؤسسات العالم (2025) يجب أن تمر دون تقصي الدروس واقتراح الحلول البديلة لضعف النموذج المعرفي الوضعي؟ هذا المقال مخصص لاستعراض أبرز الاتجاهات الحديثة في أحد أكثر العلوم الشرعية أهمية خلال العقد الأخير، الا وهو فقه السَّنن الربانية، أي فقه استدامة المجتمعات وعمرانها ونظامها وديناميكيتها بناء على تكامل الوحي والعقل معاً.

هذا المقال هو ثمرة حوار مطوّل أجريته مع ChatGPT حول الذكاء الاصطناعي وآفاقه. فقد أتاح هذا التفاعل فرصة لتأمل قدرة الآلة على محاكاة التفاعل البشري، ومعالجة الانفعالات، وإثارة قضايا أخلاقية بالغة الأهمية. فالذكاء الاصطناعي يستطيع أن يتعرف إلى الانفعالات (Emotions) ويقلّدها، لكنه لا يملك القدرة على اختبار المشاعر الداخلية (Feelings) التي تميز التجربة الإنسانية. كما ناقشنا أبعاده العسكرية، حيث يُستخدم في أنظمة قتالية متقدمة تثير تساؤلات حادة: هل يمكن أن يُفوَّض للآلة اتخاذ قرارات مصيرية في الحياة والموت، أم يظل الإشراف البشري شرطًا لا يُستغنى عنه؟ إن هذا الحوار يكشف في آن واحد عن إمكانات الذكاء الاصطناعي الهائلة في خدمة التطور البشري والسلام العالمي، وعن حدوده التي تُبقي المسؤولية الأخلاقية والوعي العميق في يد الإنسان وحده.

Denne er artikel gengiver observationer og overvejelser vedrørende Jesus som Frelser i Etiopien i Mekane Yesus kirken og på Mekane Yesus Seminary. Blandt Etiopiske evangelikale artiklueres Jesus ofte som herre, hvilket i nogle tilfaelde leder til en praestationskristendom, hvor Jesus først og fremmest er en der skal adlydes. Dernaest belyses frelses sociale og etniske aspekter i Etiopisk kontekst, hvor det overvejes hvorvidt en påvirkning fra neopentekostalismen koblet med en ukritisk kontekstualisering fører til øgede etniske spaendinger. Ind dette kan Lutherske kernebudskaber om retfaerdiggørelse ved tro og korsteologi bidrage til vigtige korrektioner.

Smart cities are an emerging technology that is receiving new ethical attention due to recent advancements in artificial intelligence. This paper provides an overview of smart city ethics while simultaneously performing novel theorization about the definition of smart cities and the complicated relationship between (smart) cities, ethics, and politics. We respond to these ethical issues by providing an innovative representation of the agent-deed-consequence (ADC) model in symbolic terms through deontic logic. The ADC model operationalizes human moral intuitions underpinning virtue ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism. With the ADC model made symbolically representable, human moral intuitions can be built into the algorithms that govern autonomous vehicles, social robots in healthcare settings, and smart city projects. Once the paper has introduced the ADC model and its symbolic representation through deontic logic, it demonstrates the ADC model’s promise for algorithmic ethical decision-making in four dimensions of smart city ethics, using examples relating to public safety and waste management. We particularly emphasize ADC-enhanced ethical decision-making in (economic and social) sustainability by advancing an understanding of smart cities and human-AI teams (HAIT) as group agents. The ADC model has significant merit in algorithmic ethical decision-making, especially through its elucidation in deontic logic. Algorithmic ethical decision-making, if structured by the ADC model, successfully addresses a significant portion of the perennial questions in smart city ethics, and smart cities built with the ADC model may in fact be a significant step toward resolving important social dilemmas of our time.

https://doi.org/10.3390/a18100625

El capítulo analiza los riesgos ontológicos, éticos y epistémicos de la digitalización desde una perspectiva filosófica centrada en la teoría de la documentalidad de Maurizio Ferraris. Se plantea que la expansión de la documentación digital configura una nueva forma de existencia social, en la cual la validez de los objetos sociales depende de su inscripción en registros digitales. A través de una revisión histórica de los hitos de la digitalización y una exposición sistemática de diversas posiciones filosóficas contemporáneas (Ferraris, Floridi, Stiegler, Han, Flusser, Zuboff, entre otros), se identifica una tendencia a la hiperdigitalización que afecta la subjetividad, la autonomía, la privacidad y la experiencia. El autor sostiene que no todo puede ni debe documentarse ni digitalizarse, y que esta resistencia a la documentación absoluta representa una defensa del núcleo irreductible de la experiencia humana. Finalmente, se argumenta que la filosofía tiene la tarea de ofrecer una crítica normativa frente a la documanidad, entendida como una condición en la que los seres humanos son reducidos a datos documentales. El texto concluye que el reconocimiento de lo indocumentable constituye una forma de resistencia ética ante las lógicas de registro totalizante.

This Element tackles the question of how – in what way, and in virtue of what – facts about the legal properties and relations of particulars (such as their rights, duties, powers, etc.) are metaphysically explained. This question is divided into two separate issues. First, the Element focuses on the nature of the explanatory relation connecting legal facts to their metaphysical determinants. Second, it looks into the kinds of entities that figure in the explanation of legal facts. In doing so, special attention is paid to the role that laws, or legal norms, play in such explanations. As it turns out, there are different ways in which legal facts might be explained, all of which have something to be said in their favor, and none of which is immune from problems.

Little is known about the folk ontology of money. Across four studies, we examined how participants classify two important cases: currency artifacts (bills and coins) and ad hoc currency objects, which include artifacts not intended to be currency (e.g. cigarettes) and natural objects (e.g. shells). In all studies, participants reliably categorized shells and cigarettes as money only when they functioned as a currency within the current social system. In contrast, many participants continued to classify currency artifacts as money even when they no longer functioned as currency. Interestingly, responses were bimodal, with participants either fully endorsing or rejecting the classification of defunct currency artifacts as money. When asked to generate properties of money, participants mentioned social (e.g. being a medium of exchange) and physical (e.g. having a serial number) properties, but rated social properties as more important. Participants saw artifacts and social conditions as interacting but placed more weight on social conditions overall. Therefore, data indicated that although participants primarily represented money as a social kind, the intuition that broken or unused artifacts retain their intended kind led people to sometimes classify as money those artifacts that exist in virtue of social conditions.

Du mythe du « bon sauvage » à l'ontologie relationnelle 7 En partant de ce qui est communément appelé le « mythe du bon sauvage », ce chapitre propose d'examiner comment la société occidentale a construit le stéréotype de l'autochtone proche de la nature. À partir de textes de la Renaissance et des premiers explorateurs, mais aussi des images contemporaines véhiculées par la culture populaire, nous visons à indiquer l'ethnocentrisme de ce stéréotype et ses limites pour comprendre les relations particulières qui unissent les Autochtones à leurs territoires. Nous proposons ensuite d'utiliser le modèle de l'ontologie relationnelle afin de nous rapprocher davantage des manières de penser et d'habiter le territoire parmi les Autochtones. En recourant à des exemples de pratiques de la chasse chez les Eeyouch/Cris de la Baie-James (Québec), nous illustrons la contemporanéité de ces ontologies relationnelles -ou animistesqui témoignent d'un rapport au territoire et aux êtres qui le peuplent radicalement différent de celui de nos sociétés occidentales. Enfin, en guise d'ouverture, nous faisons le lien entre la littérature liée au « tournant ontologique » et les écrits sur la résurgence autochtone, faisant ultimement appel à une forme d'animisme méthodologique.

En 2027, nous commémorerons les trente ans du décès de Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997), intellectuel inclassable dont l'oeuvre protéiforme continue de nourrir la pensée contemporaine. Philosophe, économiste, psychanalyste, théoricien politique, militant, il a construit une réflexion d'une rare puissance sur la liberté, la création, l'institution du social, l'autonomie individuelle et collective. Depuis ses années de jeunesse en Grèce, en passant par Socialisme ou Barbarie et jusqu'à sa disparition, son itinéraire traverse et bouscule les frontières disciplinaires autant qu'idéologiques. Ce congrès international entend revenir, trois décennies après qu'il s'est éteint, sur l'héritage intellectuel légué par le philosophe grec, mais aussi sur la manière dont ses concepts permettent encore aujourd'hui de penser notre société. Face aux défis de notre temps, la pensée castoriadienne offre des ressources précieuses pour interroger les fondements mêmes de nos sociétés, de l'agir politique et de la pensée philosophique.
Trie-sur-Baïse (Hautes-Pyrénées, 65, France)
27, 28 et 29 octobre 2027
Organisation scientifique
Quentin Mur Rodriguez (Sociologue, Université d’Ottawa et Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès)
Emile Le Pessot (Historien, EHESS)
Guillaume Plin (Philosophe, Université Paris-Nanterre)
Savvas Orfanos (Philosophe, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Comité scientifique
Stéphane Vibert, Nicolas Piqué, Philippe Caumières, Florence Giust-Desprairies, Olivier
Fressard, Thibault Tranchant, Gilles Labelle, Alexandros Schismenos, Nicolas Poirier
Calendrier prévisionnel
● Date limite d’envoi des propositions : 1
er décembre 2025
● Réponse du comité scientifique : 1
er avril 2026
● Programme final : 1
er novembre 2026
● Colloque : 27, 28 et 29 octobre 2027
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In 2027, we will mark thirty years since the passing of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997), a singular thinker whose multifaceted work continues to shape contemporary intellectual thought. Philosopher, economist, psychoanalyst, political theorist, and activist, he developed a
powerful and original reflection on freedom, creation, the institution of society, and both individual and collective autonomy. From his younger days in Greece, through Socialisme ou Barbarie, to his passing, his intellectual journey crossed and challenged disciplinary and ideological boundaries. This international conference aims to reexamine, three decades after his death, both the intellectual legacy of the Greek philosopher and the relevance of his conceptual tools for thinking about today’s society. In the face of the challenges of our time, Castoriadis’ thought offers valuable resources to question the very foundations of our
societies, political action, and philosophical inquiry.
Provisional Timeline
● Submissions deadline : December 1, 2025
● Notification of acceptance : April 1, 2026
● Final program release : November 1, 2026
● Conference dates : October 27-29, 2027

In the face of planetary crises, from biodiversity loss to climate change to food security, transdisciplinarity promises more effective and just responses through more equal collaborations. However, transdisciplinarity also creates complex challenges by bringing together different actors, from scientists to Indigenous communities to policymakers. Successful collaboration among such actors requires navigating different forms of knowledge, worldviews, values, and positions of power. Transformative Transdisciplinarity synthesizes insights from philosophy of science and empirical action research in addressing these challenges through a framework of partial overlaps. On the one hand, the framework highlights overlapping concerns and perspectives of actors that provide common ground for collaboration and mutual understanding. On the other hand, it emphasizes partialities that require navigating differences and tensions between actors. This book addresses the fundamental epistemological, ontological, and political questions of transdisciplinarity through this framework of partial overlaps, aiming for a transformative vision of collaborative science in the face of planetary crises. By addressing these foundational questions, Transformative Transdisciplinarity also develops a novel vision of community-based philosophy that engages with global challenges through collaborations with local communities and empirical researchers. In contrast with empirically disengaged armchair philosophy, this book shows how philosophers can play an important role in mediating between epistemologies and ontologies of diverse actors as well as the political inequalities between them.

À Ana, pelo amor de todos os dias. À Maria Laura e à Maria Cecília, que tornaram o meu mundo muito melhor e dão sentido e direção às minhas ações. Aos meus pais, primeiros e amados mestres que me ensinaram a fazer minha própria história. Ao meu irmão Geraldo, pelo incentivo de longos anos, sem o qual possivelmente haveria interrompido minha trajetória de estudos antes mesmo de chegar à Universidade. Ao meu irmão Paulo, por sua amizade e cuidados na infância. À Maria Jerônimo, pelas tardes de café e conselhos de vida. Ao seu Tito, pelos longos papos filosóficos no campo da sabedoria popular. À comadre Joana Dar'c, por sua dedicação familiar e amor devotado às minhas filhas. Aos compadres Melk e Wiliane, por nos confiar parte da educação do Arthur, afilhado querido. À Ivaneide, cunhada e amiga, por encher-nos de esperança com o seu príncipe Benjamin. À Cristiellen, prima-tia da Laura e da Cecília, pelas pizzas de sábado à noite. À Aline, por sua disponibilidade em ajudar. À Afra, cunhada querida, pelos dias aconchegantes em São Paulo. Ao Pádua, à Rose e suas filhas, pela alegria compartilhada em Jaguariúna. Ao Elton e à Monique, agradável companhia em Campos do Jordão. Ao Fafá e à Liduína, Elvis e Aurilene por sua amizade e carinho. Aos amigos Thiago, Rebeca e suas princesas, Júlia e Marina, provas de que a distância apenas fortalece os grandes sentimentos. Ao Gleilson, Samile, Sofia, Gabriel e toda sua família pela amizade saudável e duradoura. Aos amigos e amigas da Comunidade Eclesial de Base Santa Luzia, por tudo que me ensinaram e ensinam desde 1994. Aos amigos Emanoel, Rosângela, Gorete, Adéle, Nágela, Felipe, Daniele, Samara, Cezar, Helena Freres por seu companheirismo. Aos amigos Solonildo Almeida e Simone César, pela disponibilidade sempre demonstrada. Às Fisioterapeutas Marcelle Gomes e Micaelle Sindeaux, pelo empenho profissional em minha reabilitação. Ao Dr. Paulo Wagner, por sua competência cirúrgica. Aos colegas Professores, Técnicos, Funcionários e Alunos do IFCE Campus Acaraú, pelo apoio durante o último ano de doutorado. Aos companheiros da Prefeitura Municipal de Fortaleza, em especial aos colegas da EMEIF Educador Paulo Freire, onde aprendi a alfabetizar crianças. À Linha Marxismo, Educação e Luta de Classes da UFC, lugar de realização das nossas possibilidades teórico revolucionárias. Aos funcionários do PPGE da UFC, por sua disponibilidade e ajuda. Aos professores e colegas do Instituto de Estudos e Pesquisas do Movimento Operário, onde palmilhei meus primeiros passos no campo do marxismo onto revolucionário. Às Professoras Betânia Moraes, Ruth de Paula e Maurilene do Carmo, por aceitar participar da banca com espírito militante.

In the face of planetary crises — from biodiversity loss to climate change to food security — transdisciplinary methods promise effective and just responses through equal collaborations. However, transdisciplinarity also creates complex challenges by bringing together different actors with different frameworks, like scientists, Indigenous and local communities, and policy makers. Successful collaboration among such actors requires navigating different forms of knowledge, worldviews, values, and positions of power. In Transformative Transdisciplinarity, David Ludwig and Charbel N. El-Hani synthesize insights from the philosophy of science and empirical action research to address these challenges through a framework of partial overlaps. On the one hand, the framework highlights the overlapping concerns and perspectives of actors that provide common ground for collaboration and mutual understanding. On the other hand, it emphasizes partialities that require navigating differences and tensions between actors. This book addresses the fundamental epistemological, ontological, and political questions of transdisciplinarity through this framework of partial overlaps, aiming for a transformative vision of collaborative science in the face of planetary crises.

The aim of this article is to develop an understanding-based argument for an explicitly political specification of the concept of race. It is argued that a specification of race in terms of hierarchical social positions is best equipped to guide causal reasoning about racial inequality in the public sphere. Furthermore, the article provides evidence that biological and cultural specifications of race mislead public reasoning by encouraging confusions between correlates and causes of racial inequality. The article concludes with a more general case for incorporating empirical evidence about public reasoning into philosophical debates about competing specifications of the concept of race.

Henry Fernando's short article, "Can Legal Obligations Arise From Mere Social Facts?" has recently been published on the official website of the American Philosophical Association (APA), the largest organization of professional philosophers based in the United States.

Since January 2022, the APA has invited pitches from scholars around the world to publish only one mainstream, public-friendly article per month for its "Law and Philosophy" series. The series aims to promote contemporary issues in legal philosophy and jurisprudence to non-specialized, non-academic audiences.

Earlier this year, Fernando was among those invited to pitch an article by series editor Prof. Eric Wilkinson. His article was eventually screened and peer-reviewed before it was selected as the APA's sole post for the series for the month of July 2025.

In this article, he discusses how legal positivism, the view that law is a matter of social fact, might plausibly defend itself against natural law theorists who criticize it for lacking the moral resources needed to account for the normative, obligation-imposing character of law.

The history of philosophy has always been shadowed by the enigma of absence. From Parmenides' uncompromising denial of non-being, through Plato's shadows, Aristotle's potentiality, Augustine's privation, and Aquinas' due order, the West has sought to understand how absence can be spoken without granting it substance. Modern phenomenology in Heidegger and Sartre deepened the experiential register of nothingness, while analytic ontology examined fictions, negations, and abstracta. Contemporary science and mathematics continue this discourse in their treatment of zero, infinity, vacua, and informational paradigms. Yet across traditions, the paradox remains: absence both is not, and yet it structures our thought, culture, and existence. This paper introduces and develops the concept of Apophion, defined as structured absence, a parasitic non-being intelligible only within the Logos-created field of creation. Unlike sheer void, Apophion possesses order by relation to the good it denies; unlike substance, it has no autonomy or generative power. It manifests in mathematics, physics, culture, and morality, but always as derivative and parasitic. This Logos-centred ontology safeguards against pantheism, affirms creation ex nihilo, distinguishes cultural fictions from moral evil, and situates the discourse in Christological and eschatological resolution. Engaging classical philosophy, patristic theology, Reformed thought, phenomenology, analytic ontology, and scientific discourse, the study shows that Apophion clarifies the grammar of absence without collapsing into dualism or nihilism. In Christ, absence is not ultimate but overcome; the Resurrection abolishes Apophion, and ontology culminates in doxology. The paper concludes that to speak truthfully of non-being is to confess that even absence has meaning only because the Logos sustains creation.

Peristiwa (Event-Related Potential, ERP), yang mampu menilai aktiviti-aktiviti neuro-temporal tertentu. Makalah ini mengetengahkan pentingnya kajian ke atas asas neurobiologi tentang bagaimana kemiskinan memberi kesan ke atas fungsi kognitif. Pemahaman ke atas tingkah laku berkaitan aktiviti-aktiviti neural tertentu akan dapat membantu dalam membangunkan program-program intervensi yang berkesan yang boleh disasarkan untuk meningkatkan kebolehan membuat keputusan bagi individu-individu yang tergolong dalam golongan miskin.

— ENGLISH SUMMARY
The Seal of the Earth: The Fall of Ontology into Soil emphasizes that throughout history ontology has been conceived by looking upward, toward the transcendent. From Plato’s ideas to Descartes’ pure thought, philosophy has often located being in the abstract. Yet human existence was first experienced by stepping on the soil and breathing in its scent. Terrestrial Ontology seeks to relocate the question of being from the sky to the ground—into stone, wind, water, and geography.
The central claim of Terrestrial Ontology is that thought, memory, and knowledge are always born within a specific place, culture, and time. Being is not only universal but also local, historical, and cultural. The memory of stones, the silence of mountains, the narrow streets of a city, or the coolness of a village fountain—all reveal that ontology emerges from the ground. Thus, philosophy must be tied to humans, culture, and space. The difference between the stones of Jerusalem and the pavements of Vienna shows how memory is inscribed in place. Place is not a backdrop but a constitutive element of being.
The text highlights the poetic and political dimensions of space. Memory is not stored solely in the mind but sealed into stones, houses, and streets. Inspired by Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space, it argues that childhood streets and domestic spaces shape personal memory. Collective memory, too, is written into place: Jerusalem’s stones hold religious traces, soldiers’ blood, children’s games, and tourists’ photographs. Yet space also erases memory when rebuilt; hence preserving space means preserving memory.
Time, within Terrestrial Ontology, is cyclical and layered rather than linear. The surface of a stone or the history of a city square reveals accumulated temporal strata. Cycles—seasons, rituals, daily practices—constantly rewrite being. Time both erodes and constructs; memory is the seal resisting its destructive force. Once ontology is grounded, time is understood together with space.
Subjectivity is also redefined. Against the modern image of an autonomous self, the subject is constructed through layers of space, time, and memory. Childhood streets, social relations, rituals, and spatial attachments shape identity. The subject is not fixed but a text that can be rewritten.
Finally, the text issues a political call: to protect place is to protect memory, for a society without memory becomes rootless. Terrestrial Ontology thus offers both a philosophical and ethical invitation. It envisions time as cyclical and stratified, memory as spatial, and the subject as relational. By challenging traditional ontology, it proposes an epistemological revolution: to ask “Who am I?” always alongside “Where am I from?”.


— TÜRKÇE ÖZET
Yer’in Mührü: Ontolojinin Toprağa Düşüşü adlı metin, ontolojinin tarih boyunca göğe yönelmiş bakışlarla kurulduğunu, ancak insanın varlığını ilk kez toprakla temas ederek duyumsadığını vurgular. Platon’dan Descartes’a kadar felsefi gelenek aşkın olana bakarken, Yersel Ontoloji varlığı yeryüzüne indirir; taşın, rüzgârın, suyun ve coğrafyanın içinde arar.
Yersel Ontoloji’nin temel iddiası, düşüncenin her zaman belirli bir mekân, kültür ve zaman bağlamında ortaya çıktığıdır. Varlık evrensel olduğu kadar yereldir; taşların hafızasında, şehirlerin sokaklarında, köy çeşmelerinde saklıdır. Bu yaklaşım, düşünceyi insana, mekâna ve kültüre bağlayan yeni bir epistemolojik çerçeve önerir. Kudüs’ün taşlarıyla Viyana’nın kaldırımları arasındaki fark, hafızanın mekâna yazıldığını gösterir. Yer yalnızca fon değil, varlığın kurucu unsurudur.
Metin, mekânın şiirsel ve politik bir boyutu olduğuna dikkat çeker. Hafıza, yalnızca zihinde değil, taşlarda, evlerde, sokaklarda mühürlenir. Gaston Bachelard’ın Mekânın Poetikası’ndan ilhamla, çocukluk sokaklarının taşları ya da bir evin kokusu bireysel hafızayı kurar. Kolektif hafıza da aynı şekilde mekâna yazılır; Kudüs’ün taşları hem kutsal izler hem de savaşların, oyunların ve ziyaretlerin çok katmanlı hafızasını taşır. Ancak mekân değiştikçe hafıza da silinir; bu yüzden mekânı korumak, hafızayı korumaktır.
Zaman, Yersel Ontoloji’de doğrusal değil, döngüsel ve katmanlıdır. Taşların yüzeyinde, şehir meydanlarında biriken izler zamanın tortularını gösterir. Döngüler—mevsimler, ritüeller, günlük alışkanlıklar—varlığı sürekli yeniden yazar. Zaman hem yıpratıcıdır hem kurucu; hafıza bu akışa direnen mühürdür. Ontoloji gökten yere indirildiğinde, zaman da mekânla birlikte düşünülür.
Özne anlayışı da bu bağlamda yeniden tanımlanır. Modern felsefenin öne sürdüğü bağımsız, kendi kendine var olan benlik yerine, özne mekân, zaman ve hafızanın katmanlarında yapılanır. Çocukluk sokakları, toplumsal ilişkiler, ritüeller ve mekânsal bağlar öznenin kimliğini biçimlendirir. Böylece özne sabit değil, sürekli yeniden yazılabilen bir metin hâline gelir.
Metin ayrıca politik bir çağrı yapar: Mekânı korumak, hafızayı korumaktır; hafızasız toplum köksüzleşir. Bu nedenle Yersel Ontoloji hem felsefi hem etik bir davettir. Zamanı katmanlı ve döngüsel, hafızayı mekânsal, özneyi ilişkisel gören bu yaklaşım, geleneksel ontolojiden koparak yeni bir epistemolojik devrim teklif eder: “Ben kimim?” sorusunu “Neredenim?” sorusuyla iç içe düşünmek.

The question of what art is and why certain objects and events are considered art is examined. In the light of John Searle's Social Philosophy, a hybrid Institutionalist-Functionalist explanation of what counts as art is presented. However, Searle's apparatus applied to the ontology of the work of art is not enough to answer the question of why art has the status it exhibits. The proposal is to trace back the ontology of art to the origins of the dichotomy between freedom and necessity, and more specifically to the notion of Bend in itself^ presented by Kant, as the status that persons have. Ultimately, the ontology of art emerges as a projection of the status Bend in itself^, of personhood, to objects and events.

Feeling someone else's pain means that we can experience what the other experiences. However, pain as an experience seems to be non-shareable. This means that I cannot live through your pain in the same ways as you cannot live through mine; whereas empathy is also considered as the way in which we can directly and immediately perceive or feel someone else’s experience in one’s expression. The overarching goal of this paper is to seek resources from the phenomenological tradition to clarify what it means to feel someone else’s pain by reconciling both intuitions that pain is only given as firsthand experience and the immediacy of the givenness of the other’s pain in empathy. The resolution to this apparent tension hinges on the clarification of the nature of our embodiment. In this paper, I first address the idea that pain is given as a firsthand embodied feeling by explaining a Husserlian conception of the body-in-pain. I then draw resources from the phenomenological accounts to explicate the immediacy involved in empathy by clarifying its intentional structure. Third, I clarify Husserl’s conception of the lived-body (Leib) as an expressive whole (Ausdruckseinkeit) to illustrate the “object” of our empathy. To conclude, I turn to the clinicians-patients relation to explain the practical and ethical implications of empathy to illuminate what it means to feel someone else’s pain.

As Agustín Fuentes suggests, evolutionary theory calls for the involvement of other disciplines to help reconstruct the picture of how the species homo not only created a niche in which to live but produced whole worlds of culture. As has been noted, "Most of the distinctively human traits are either adaptations for culture or the side effects of those adaptations." 1 In this essay, I will present some insights from philosophy that hopefully can converge with the investigations and proposals of other disciplines. In particular, I will examine the notions of "personhood" and "collective intentionality" which are, as we will see later, co-implicated.

El artículo diagnostica una situación contradictoria vinculada con la tradición posfrankfurtiana de la teoría crítica, esto es, la que se inaugura con la ruptura de Habermas con la primera Escuela de Frankfurt. Es notorio y exige algún tipo de explicación que los representantes posfrankfurtianos más destacados tengan siempre, conscientemente o no, dos ontologías sociales paralelas y en contradicción. Buscamos mostrar cómo eso se produce en los casos de Habermas, Honneth y Jaeggi. La condición común a los tres autores es atribuida en distintos grados a la ausencia de reconocimiento de la contradicción real de la sociedad capitalista, que retorna como un síntoma, en el sentido psicoanalítico del término, por la puerta trasera de sus teorías.

I am indebted and grateful to all the commentators for their insightful contributions. I find myself agreeing with a good deal of their responses, and even those I don't agree with have provided me with a productive opportunity to further refine and clarify my view. Let me also express a special word of gratitude to Andrew Inkpin and Marilyn Stendera for inviting me to contribute with the lead article and for managing the whole process in such a constructive manner. 'I, You, and We: Beyond Individualism and Collectivism' can to some extent be seen as a precis of a book that was yet to be written. Since submitting the lead article, I have managed to finish the book in question, which in addition to offering more extensive analyses of all the themes briefly addressed in the article also covers many additional topics (Zahavi 2025).

Selon une thèse largement partagée, le droit et une pratique sociale et les contributions des participants sont complémentaires les unes des autres. Dans ces conditions, le raisonnement juridique consiste d'abord en une interprétation de ces pratiques et présuppose un point de vue interne de la part de celui qui souhaite en rendre compte. Le raisonnement juridique est ainsi conçu comme une argumentation pratique, subordonnée aux exigences de la rationalité car ceux qui participent à la pratique juridique sont contraints de donner des raisons à leur action et ces raisons tissent un réseau de contraintes. Très séduisante, cette thèse qui doit beaucoup à la critique des réalistes par Hart, n'en demeure pas moins justiciable de quelque critique. Keywords-Raisonnement juridique • Pratique sociale • Argumentation • Herméneutique • Hart • Dworkin • Interprétation • Valeurs • Point de vue interne • Très à la mode depuis les années 80, l'expression de « raisonnement juridique » (juristische ou encore juridische Argumentation, legal reasoning, razonamiento juridico, ragionamento giuridico) n'était-sauf erreur-que très rarement employée jusque dans les années soixante. Elle ne figure pas telle quelle chez les principaux auteurs tels que Hart, Kelsen ou Ross pour ne