Extract from chapter regarding life narratives. Identity is not a current concept in psychoanalysis, despite the success Erikson’s concept of psychosocial identity had outside psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, it owes psychoanalytic theory,...
moreExtract from chapter regarding life narratives.
Identity is not a current concept in psychoanalysis, despite the success Erikson’s concept of psychosocial identity had outside psychoanalysis. Nevertheless, it owes psychoanalytic theory, and we suggest that later developments in psychoanalysis continue to potentially inform the concept of identity. We therefore take an approach to psychoanalytic perspectives on identity as did Frosh (2012) a decade ago, by providing a selective historical review of implicit contributions of psychoanalysis to the concept of identity. However, we discuss somewhat different authors, and our discussion does not stress an insurmountable impossibility of achieving identity, as did Frosh by reference to Lacan and Laplanche. Instead we will argue for a narrative and co-narrative conception of identity that acknowledges the interpersonal and social process character of identity based on a realist epistemological position.
This chapter outlines the development of the concept of identity in psychoanalysis in four steps, highlighting achievements and relative deficiencies for each:
1. The concept of identity was initially only implicit in psychoanalytic theorizing, foremost in Freud’s synthetic function of the ego and in Federn’s (1952) cohesion of ego feeling.
2. Erikson (1946) introduced the concept of ego-identity, also termed psychosocial identity, which served to extend a view of development driven by biological maturation and identifications to include sociocultural influences in adolescence and beyond. Based on sociological, cultural, and psychological theories, Erikson (1964, 1968) integrated a clinical view on the pre-reflective sense of self with a reflected self-image as it relates to central roles and values. Three aspects of ego-identity are bipolar dimensions: Individuality versus belonging to a group, synchronic consistency across situations versus situational flexibility, and diachronic self-continuity of still being an identical person across personal development and change. Erikson also stressed three other crucial aspects of identity, namely agency as the ability to initiate actions, give direction to one’s life, and take on responsibility; feeling at home in one’s body; and self-esteem. In addition, Erikson located the major development of identity in adolescence, linking it to the life story.
3. In the 1950s to 1970s, more clinically oriented analysts elaborated theories of self-with-other. However, only Kernberg (1984) explicitly took up Erikson’s concept of identity and integrated it with ego psychology and object-relations theory.
4. Since the 1990s the idea of an integrated and more or less stable identity was criticized for leaving out how others co-constitute identity and how it shifts from moment to moment. We discuss the radicalization of the epistemic stance by Ogden (1994) and Ferro (1992), who undermine the classical importance of personal history and identity with more than a postmodern whiff.
5. Finally, we argue for a narrative conception of identity, bending back to Erikson’s conception of identity as a life story that reaches beyond the couch, presenting an updated concept of narrative identity which is enriched by psychoanalytic developments of the past fifty years.