Cognitive Revolution

We are living in an era in which the focus of human relationships with the world is shifting from performing and physical to controlling and cognitive/informational interactions. This emerging, increasingly informational world is our new ecology, an infosphere that presents the grounds for a cognitive revolution based on interactions in networks of biological and artificial, intelligent agents. After the industrial revolution, which extended the human body through mechanical machinery, the cognitive revolution extends the human mind/cognition through information processing machinery. These novel circumstances come with new qualities and preferences demanding new conceptualizations. We have some work ahead of us to establish value systems and practices extended from the real to the virtual or info-computational. This paper first presents a current view of the virtual versus the actual, and then offers an interpretation framework based on an info-computational understanding of cognition in which agency implies computational processing of informational structures of the world as an infosphere. Here the concept of agency implies the ability to act on one's own behalf. An agent is hence an autonomous decision-making entity. The notion of "good life" is discussed in light of different ideals of well-being in the infosphere, connecting virtuality as a space of potential and alternative worlds for an agent for whom the reality is a space of actual experiences, in the sense of Deleuze. Even though info-computational framework enables us to see both the real world and diversity of virtual worlds in terms of computational processes on informational structures, based on a distinct layered cognitive architecture of all physical agents there is clear difference between potential worlds of the virtual and actual agent's experiences made in the real. The conclusion is that by cocooning ourselves in an elaborate info-computational infrastructure of the virtual we may be increasingly isolating ourselves from the reality of direct experience of the world. The biggest challenges of the cognitive revolution may be ethical, not technological; they are about the nature of being human and its values. This article points to some of the challenges of cognitive revolution, as understood within infocomputational framework.

Este artigo apresenta um histórico da revolução cognitiva em psicologia, uma discussão crítica sobre ela e as implicações epistemológicas para o status científico da psicologia. Surgida na década de 50 e tendo o paradigma do processamento de informação como base, a psicologia cognitiva foi difundida como uma revolução científica, tal como proposta por T. Kuhn. Essa proposta se mostrou falsa, colocando dúvidas sobre a cientificidade da psicologia. Propõe-se o abandono da filosofia de Kuhn e a adoção do naturalismo normativo como uma saída frutífera para as psicologias.

نسان شناسان، حضور بقایایی که نشان دهنده ی پیچیدگی های رفتاری (همانند تولید هنر) می باشند را حاصل شکل گیری ظرفیت های شناختیِ پیچیده در ذهن می دانند. تاکنون سه فرضیه اصلی (انقلاب شناختی، فرآیند تجمعیِ تدریجیِ تطور و گونه های چند گانه) در خصوص منشأ چگونگیِ آغازِ پیچیدگی های رفتاری و ظرفیت های شناختی بر مبنای قدیمی ترین آثارِ هنری و صنعتیِ به جای مانده از انسان شکل گرفته است. در این پژوهش با بررسیِ قدیمی ترین یافته های مرتبط با زیورآلات در دوران پارینه سنگیِ ایران این سه فرضیه مورد مطالعه قرار خواهند گرفت. هدف از این پژوهش بررسیِ جایگاهِ ایران در مطالعات شکل گرفته در خصوص خاستگاه های احتمالیِ ظرفیت های شناختی در انسان می باشد. بر این اساس قدیمی ترین یافته های خودآرایی در ایران (از محوطه های پارینه سنگی غار یافته در لرستان، غار بوف در استان فارس و غارهای کمیشان، کمربند و التپه در مازندران) نشان می دهند که خودآرایی همانند دیگر اجزای مدرنیته ی رفتاریِ فرض شده مفهومی نیست که در تاریخ پنجاه هزار سال قبل به طورِ ناگهان ظهور کرده باشد، بلکه قدیمی ترین آثارِ نمادینِ شناخته شده از انسانِ هوشمند در آفریقا نشان دهنده ی حضورِ بقایای مدرنیته ی رفتاری، هزاران سال پیش از ورود انسانِ هوشمند به اوراسیا هستند. از این منظر انسانِ هوشمند از همان ابتدا دارای ظرفیت های شناختیِ موردِ نظر بوده است و براساس شرایط و نیازهای احتمالیِ خویش این ظرفیت ها را به دیگر نقاط جهان انتقال داده است.

In this article we examine some of the relations between behavior analysis and the pragmatic philosophy of William James. We point out that the adoption of effectiveness as a truth criterion is common to both systems, which warrants a closer examination of its implications. We present the Skinnerian concepts of knowledge, science, and truth as compatible with aspects of pragmatic philosophy; at the same time they emphasize the role of social contingencies posed by the scientific verbal community in the control of scientific verbal behavior. We argue here that effectiveness, both in Skinner’s radical behaviorism and in James’ pragmatic philosophy, does not have the status of either independent or sufficient criterion to validate knowledge claims. We call attention to some generic and imprecise uses of that criterion in behavior-analytic literature and propose that a more consistent usage would involve subordinating effectiveness to a coherence criterion.

The Behavior Analysis (BA) has benefited in the past and continues to benefit from a specific kind of operational interpretations of terms/expressions developed in other systems of Psychology and similar areas. The Skinnerian model of the operational interpretation of terms of other theories consists of the analysis of the context where theoreticians and researchers emit the analyzed terms/expressions. Therefore, these interpretations are analysis of the verbal behavior of psychologists. Innumerable examples of this practice can be found in the workmanship of Skinner and are recurrent in diverse periodics of the BA. In this article we argue the implications of these analyses for the survival of the BA as a cultural practice, for the conceptual, theoretical, and technological perfectioning of the BA and for teaching BA. Based on these analyses, it can be argued that the interpretation of terms of other theories should be considered an important program of research and should receive ...

The Behavior Analysis (BA) has benefited in the past and continues to benefit from a specific kind of operational interpretation of terms/expressions developed in other systems of Psychology and similar areas. The Skinnerian model of the operational interpretation of ...

The foundations of biology have been a topic of debate for the past few decades. The traditional perspective of the Modern Synthesis, which portrays organisms as passive entities with a limited explanatory role in evolutionary theory, is giving way to a new paradigm where organisms are recognized as active agents, actively shaping their own phenotypic traits for adaptive goals. Within this context, this article raises the question of whether contemporary biological theory is undergoing a cognitive revolution. This inquiry can be approached in two ways: from a theoretical standpoint, exploring the centrality of the cognitive sciences in current theoretical biology; and from a historical perspective, examining the resemblance between the current state of theoretical biology and the Cognitive Revolution of the mid-20th century. Both inquiries yield affirmative answers, though important nuances will be emphasized. The cognitive sciences' explanatory framework is employed to elucidate the agentic characteristics of organisms, establishing a clear parallelism between the Cognitive Revolution and the present state of theoretical biology.

(1913) and B.F. Skinner (1956) both argued that humans, and human behavior, are part of the natural world on a continuum with other living species and their behaviors. Recognizing this continuum facilitates progress toward the scientific goal of behaviorism which both Watson (1913) and Skinner (1953) identified as the prediction and control of behavior. Understanding continuum of behavior across species and behaviorism's scientific goal of prediction and control has important implications for identifying and understanding basic principles of behavior and for the continued success of applied behavior analysis and the experimental analysis of behavior.

Behaviorism dominated the field of SLA until the end of the 1960s and found its most visible application in contrastive analysis and the audiolingual method (Johnson, 2004, p. 10). In this tradition, the focus was on the learner's external environment. By now it is consensus that a mature psychology will contain a level of intermediate theory which bridges the divide between physiology and behavior, but there is disagreement over the best way to do that (Reisman, 2003). Now behaviorism is like a cube of sugar dissolved in tea; it has no major, distinct existence but it is everywhere (Harzem, 2004).

Four recent books on the history and nature of behaviorism are reviewed: The Origins of Behaviorism by J. M. O'Donnell, From Darwin to Behaviourism by R. A. Boakes, Behaviorism: A Conceptual Reconstruction by G. E. Zu riff, and Behaviorism and Logical Positivism by L. D. Smith. Behaviorism may be understood as an orientation to psychology that emerged from prevailing functional, developmental, and pragmatic concerns during the first and second decades of the 20th century. Animal and comparative psychologists contributed heavily to its development, particularly in the areas of methodology and technology. Philosophically, behaviorism draws on pragmatism and positivism for its scientific base, although different varieties of behaviorism emphasize different aspects of this base.

the determiners of a verbal response. We argue that these different conceptions of meaning were related to distinct aspects of Skinner's explanatory system. Finally, the notion of meaning presented by Skinner in 1945 is related to the theoretical breakthrough represented by Skinner's assertion of the three-term contingency. This idea permitted verbal behavior to be analyzed in terms of its functions.

Behaviorism dominated the field of SLA until the end of the 1960s and found its most visible application in contrastive analysis and the audiolingual method (Johnson, 2004, p. 10). In this tradition, the focus was on the learner’s external environment. By now it is consensus that a mature psychology will contain a level of intermediate theory which bridges the divide between physiology and behavior, but there is disagreement over the best way to do that (Reisman, 2003). Now behaviorism is like a cube of sugar dissolved in tea; it has no major, distinct existence but it is everywhere (Harzem, 2004).

"Methodological behaviorism" is a term that frequently appears in the behavioristic literature, but one accompanied by considerable semantic confusion: the term is used to denote very different theoretical positions and the authors classified as methodological behaviorists are many and various. In order to understand the polysemic character of this term, we propose a historical analysis of its origins and development in the literature from the 50 years following its first appearance in 1923. The results reveal that it has been used by authors as diverse as Karl Lashley, B. F. Skinner, Herbert Feigl, and Gustav Bergmann. Moreover, it has been defined in terms of two central features (one a methodological assumption and the other a metaphysical one) and used to demarcate positive and negative forms of behaviorism, depending on how each author has understood those features and forms. We conclude that the term's polysemic character and different uses can be traced back to its roots in the 1920s, which helps us to understand the semantic confusion in the contemporary literature. Keywords Methodological behaviorism. History of psychology. Philosophy of psychology A quick survey of the behavioristic literature reveals that the term "methodological behaviorism" has been widely used by different authors but with different purposes. Recent uses include attempts to criticize (e.g., Costall, 2018) or defend (e.g., Manning, 2014) specific conceptions of methodological behaviorism, as well as to evaluate its compatibility with certain psychological theories in terms of similarities (e.g.

This paper is a conceptual analysis of the theory debate in psychology, as carried out by cognitivists and radical behaviorists. The debate has focused on the necessity of theories in psychology. However, the logically primary issue is the nature of theories, or what theories are. This claim stems from the fact that cognitivists and radical behaviorists adopt disparate accounts of the nature of theories. The cognitivists' account is closely akin to the received view from logical positivism, where theories are collections of statements and theoretical terms are restricted to designate unobservable entities. Radical behaviorists also conceive theories as collections of statements, but restrict theoretical terms in psychology to designate observable entities. If each side approaches the necessity issue with its preferred account, both agree that theories are necessary in psychology. Hence, there is no disagreement over the necessity of theories in psychology per se, only over the nature of theories. The received view, however, has been shown to suffer from irreparable difficulties that have led to its total rejection in post-positivistic philosophy of science. Alternative accounts, like the structuralist and semantic views, do not raise the issue of whether theories are necessary in psychology.

The historian and philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard proposed the concept of epistemological barriers to describe the intellectual challenges encountered by scientists in their work. In order to embrace novel ways of approaching a problem in science, scientists must overcome barriers or obstacles posed by their prior views. For example, Einsteinian physics presents scientists with claims that space is curved and that time and space are on the same continuum. We utilize Bachelard's concept of epistemological barriers to describe the differences between the intellectual journeys students pursuing advanced studies face when attempting to accept cognitive psychology or radical behaviorism. We contend that the folk psychological beliefs that students typically hold when entering these studies pose less challenge to cognitive psychology than to radical behaviorism. We also suggest that these barriers may also partly be involved in the problematic exegesis that has plagued radical behaviorism. In close, we offer some suggestions for dealing with these epistemological barriers.

Although the cumulative record and cumulative recorder have become closely identified with B.F. Skinner and the experimental analysis of behavior, they actually predate both. The purpose of this article is to describe some early examples of cumulative records in psychology and physiology, as well as the techniques used

Since B.F. Skinner's death in 1990, psychologists taking a historical approach are beginning to clear misconceptions of his philosophy: radical behaviorism. Contrary to the belief of many, radical behaviorism, continues to grow and branch into new areas. This paper attempts to explore the history of Skinner's assertions and place them within the context of contemporary western thought. Parallels are drawn between Skinner's science and diverse areas such as evolutionary biology and postmodern philosophy. The social construction of knowledge is one of the many lasting legacies of Skinner's work.

Depuis leur essor dans la seconde moitié du siècle, les sciences cognitives n'ont cessé de mobiliser la philosophie et son histoire. La référence à l'âge classique ( siècles) est particulièrement importante. C'est à cette période que se seraient développés plusieurs intuitions, concepts et problèmes qui seront, quelques siècles plus tard, au fondement et au centre de la « révolution cognitive » du siècle . Aussi est-ce au siècle que l'on fait souvent commencer l'histoire, ou la « préhistoire », des sciences cognitives . Le nom le plus cité dans ces histoires ou préhistoires, ainsi que dans les travaux mêmes de sciences cognitives, est celui de Descartes, dont les réflexions sur la nature des processus cérébraux, sur le fonctionnement du système sensoriel, sur le mécanisme et les différences entre l'homme et l'automate, en font « virtuellement une figure contemporaine » ; mais il est aussi question de Hobbes, de Spinoza, de Leibniz, ou encore de la « tradition épistémologique classique » qui va de Descartes à Kant, en passant par Locke, Berkeley et Hume . Cette origine classique des sciences cognitives ne renvoie toutefois pas à un passé lointain, qui demeurerait extérieur aux réflexions et aux discussions actuelles. Au contraire, les références à l'âge classique ont joué -et jouent encore -un rôle majeur dans les débats et dans la dynamique interne de ces sciences. Corrélativement, les transformations qui se sont opérées dans ce champ ont eu pour effet de modifier le regard porté sur les philosophies des et siècles. On est, en effet, passé d'une « première génération » de sciences cognitives, dans laquelle on se réclamait des auteurs de la période moderne, à une « deuxième génération » de sciences cognitives, dans laquelle on souligne au contraire la nécessité de rompre avec les héritages de la modernité, pour reconstruire la science cognitive sur de nouvelles bases conceptuelles et théoriques . Les approches défendues lors de cette seconde phase sont des approches « incarnées », externalistes et dynamiques, qui s'inspirent souvent d'autres traditions philosophiques, en particulier de la phénoménologie de Heidegger et de Merleau-Ponty. Ces évolutions n'ont toutefois pas conduit à un abandon de la référence aux philosophies classiques, qui a connu un nouvel essor dans le cadre des critiques adressées aux sciences cognitives dites « orthodoxes ». La présente contribution se propose de retracer les grandes lignes de l'histoire de ces relations entre sciences cognitives et âge classique, en revenant sur les deux grands moments qui ont été distingués. On s'attachera ainsi d'abord aux origines de ces relations lors de la révolution cognitive ou « cognitiviste » qui a donné naissance aux premières générations de sciences cognitives, puis aux transformations qui se sont opérées lors du « tournant externaliste », tant du point de vue des conceptions de l'esprit

The golden anniversary of Science and Human Behavior is cause for celebration. Toward that end, the present paper is largely an historical consideration of the book, its inception and reception, both at the time of its publication and in subsequent years. The range and intensity of reactions to S&HB mark its impact and show it to be among Skinner's most important works, if not the most important. S&HB was written as an introductory psychology text-a vigorous use of the book in our teaching could do much to benefit the dissemination of behavior analysis.

Edgar A. Singer Jr. is largely forgotten. Yet in the early twentieth century he was one of the most persistent proponents for a theory of "mind as behavior." This essay explores Singer's theory of mind as a form of experimentally-definable behavior. This interpretation of mind is derived from Singer's "philosophy of experiment," which delimits the forms of questions that can have meaningful answers. Valid questions, according to Singer's theory, must appeal to phenomena that are public in some sense and which have verifiable effects on our "mechanical images" of nature (which is not to say that such phenomena are themselves solely mechanical). From this perspective, Singer is able to give behavioral criteria for attributing "mind" to organisms and for such "mental faculties" as purpose, sensation, consciousness, and thought. It might be wondered how Singer's experimental concept of mind compares with B. F. Skinner's better-known concept of private events. Although there are difficulties involved in the interpretation of each, it would seem that Singer and Skinner are largely in agreement, although they emphasize different factors in the behavioral interpretation of mind.

A major schism in modem scientific psychology has occurred between behavior analysts and cognitive psychologists. The two groups speak in different languages, but the languages can be translated so that they are mutually understandable; when either language is translated into the other, similarities emerge from seeming differences. We draw an analogy between the basic units of behavior analysis (the operant and the establishing operation) and cognitive psychology (the production). We argue that both units describe behavior as a function of motivative and discriminative antecedents. In addition, the two perspectives account in analogous ways for ongoing changes in motivation and for control by verbal statements. Adherents of the two perspectives have experimentally analyzed some of the same problems and fashioned similar solutions for applied problems. We conclude that many of the commonly cited differences between the two perspectives are the result of misunderstanding, and that the real differences need not preclude communication and collaboration. The schism can be bridged.

In 1939 Thomas Verner Moore authored a book entitled Cognitive Psychology which shared many commonalities with the psychological perspective that emerged under the same name 25 years later. Moore rejected the behaviorism of his day, took knowing as the fundamental problem of psychology, employed reaction time procedures to differentiate among mental processes, and was committed to representationalism as an epistemology. His career, early experimental work, interaction with E. C. Tolman, and textbook are discussed.

Do we need another book about B. F. Skinner? According to Frederick Toates, the answer is ''yes'' because ''there is still much to be said'' (p. vii) about Skinner. In his recent biography, Burrhus F. Skinner: Shaper of Behaviour (2009), Toates attempts to integrate Skinner into the mainstream of psychology by showing areas of commonality between Skinner's radical behaviorism and subdisciplines within psychology such as cognitive, social, and biological psychology. Admirably, although in some instances understandably naively, Toates attempts to demonstrate the power of positive reinforcement to explain myriad complex behaviors, including a fairly lengthy interpretation of religious behavior. In addition, Toates credits Skinner for being ahead of his time on both social and environmental issues. Toates falters, however, in his insistence that behavior analysis still needs and can benefit from cognitive concepts. He nevertheless provides an otherwise objective and sympathetic view of Skinner the person and the behavioral science he helped to create in a book that should be informative for both behavior analysts and those outside the field.

The history of scientific research about verbal behavior research, especially that based on Verbal Behavior (Skinner, 1957), can be assessed on the basis of a frequency and celeration analysis of the published and presented literature. In order to discover these quantified trends, a comprehensive bibliographical database was developed. Based on several literature searches, the bibliographic database included papers pertaining to verbal behavior that were published in the Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, Behaviorism, The Behavior Analyst, and The Analysis of Verbal Behavior. A nonbehavioral journal, the Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior was assessed as a nonexample comparison. The bibliographic database also included a listing of verbal behavior papers presented at the meetings of the Association for Behavior Analysis. Papers were added to the database if they (a) were about verbal behavior, (b) referenced B.F. Skinner's (1957) book Verbal Behavior, or (c) did both. Because the references indicated the year of publication or presentation, a count per year of them was measured. These yearly frequencies were plotted on Standard Celeration Charts. Once plotted, various celeration trends in the literature became visible, not the least of which was the greater quantity of verbal behavior research than is generally acknowledged. The data clearly show an acceleration of research across the past decade. The data also question the notion that a "paucity" of research based on Verbal Behavior currently exists. Explanations of the acceleration of verbal behavior research are suggested, and plausible reasons are offered as to why a relative lack of verbal behavior research extended through the mid 1960s to the latter 1970s.

An important contribution of radical behavioral science is its analysis of verbal behavior. Slowly but surely an increasing number of efforts verify the propositions explicit or inherent in Skinner's theory of verbal behavior, or apply his analysis to clinical or educational practice. But both the theory and the effort to apply it are met with silence. Such silent neglect simply varies the calumnious attention usually given to behavioristic science. In recent years several papers have called attention to how non-behaviorists have habitually misrepresented the science of behavior and its underlying philosophy of radical behaviorism (Cooke,

The Behavior Analysis (BA) has benefited in the past and continues to benefit from a specific kind of operational interpretation of terms/expressions developed in other systems of Psychology and similar areas. The Skinnerian model of the operational interpretation of ...

Verbal Behavior, a book that by Skinner’s own account was his most important. The received view, however, is that a devastating review by a young linguist not only rendered Skinner’s interpretation of language moot but was also a major factor in ending the hegemony of behaviorism in psychology and paving the way for a cognitive revolution. Nevertheless, in taking stock of Verbal Behavior and behaviorism, both appear to be thriving. This article suggests that Verbal Behavior and behaviorism remain vital partly because they have generated suc-cessful practical applications. The year 2007 marked the 50th anniversary of the publication of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (1957). This anniversary is worth noting because, according to most accounts, a scathing review by a young linguist named Noam Chomsky (1959) in the journal Language not only undermined Skinner’s main arguments but simultaneously hammered a nail in the lid of behaviorism’s coffin and paved the way for the return of cogni...

Contemporary philosophy of mind is generally characterized by its project to naturalize the mind. Utilizing the findings of the different sciences involved in cognitive science, especially those of artificial intelligence and neuroscience, it continues to explore ways to explain the workings of the mind in purely scientific terms. But despite the rigor and sophistication of its methods, certain questions critical to its success have remained unanswered, such as how consciousness emerges from the brain's physical processes and how the phenomenal properties of our conscious experiences arise from the physical properties of our bodily experiences. This has led some scholars to seek alternative perspectives. One such perspective that is widely explored today is Buddhist thought. The centrality of the mind in Buddhist thought and its perceived compatibility with the findings of modern science make it an attractive alternative framework to carry out the naturalization project. In this paper, I aim to examine the plausibility of this strategy. In particular, I shall evaluate whether Buddhist thought provides the needed insights to overcome the challenges facing the said project.

Many of the world's current problems are the result of behavior, and traditional appeals to mental determinants are again proving inadequate. The time for a behavioristic alternative appears ripe, yet many behaviorists seem to be becoming less behavioristic and more mentalistic. When confronted with the complexity of human behavior many are resorting to the intellectual comfort and safety of mentalism. A recent example of this tendency (Schwartz et al, 1978) is presented and discussed. Additionally, speculations regarding the origins of the resurgence of mentalism are presented, and it is proposed that arranging histories which provide for more rigorous and lasting control of verbal behavior about behavior may serve to improve the situation.

In "The case for praxics," Epstein (1984) proposed that: (1) the term "praxics" should supplant "behavior analysis" and/or "the experimental analysis of behavior" to identify the scientific study of behavior; (2) a clear distinction be drawn between praxics and behaviorism; and

When initially faced with the daunting prospect of being editor of JEAB, my first reaction was one of trepidation about doing something that might harm the journal. At the time of my election the journal was doing beautifully (as it is as I take the reins). Therefore, I have determined that the old adage, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," is very good advice, and, by and large, I shall heed it. This editorial, then, will include no call for dramatic shifts in direction or style, but instead will briefly outline my view of the journal, what makes it unique, and how I hope it will remain so. Along the way, I shall acknowledge my support of innovations that were promulgated by previous editors and that have come to be important characteristics of JEAB. Of course, one thing that makes the journal distinctive in the broader arena known as experimental psychology is expressed on the inside of the front cover of each issue: A main role of JEAB is the ".... publication of experiments relevant to the behavior of individual organisms." This alone, however, would not and does not set JEAB apart. It did when the journal was founded, but now it is not uncommon to see in many journals experiments directed at the behavior of individual subjects. As one colleague observed recently, "JEAB has won. Individual-subject experiments are now acceptable in a wide range of psychologicaljournals." Those who founded JEAB (and subsequently the Journal ofApplied

The language literature contains many citations to Skinner's book Verbal Behavior (1957), however, most of them are negative and generally unsupportive. The current list of references was assembled to bring readers in contact with the growing body of literature which supports Skinner's work. A total of 136 references were found and divided into two categories, (1) conceptual, and (2) experimental and applied. These references are presented in an effort to stimulate additional research in this important aspect of behavior analysis.

The current paper describes important events in the history of research on problem solving and discusses questions regarding the classification of problems. First, the main research traditions and major research findings in the field are described. Some major problems in the attempt to define a problem, including the issue of novelty, are discussed. A solution is suggested, based upon the definition of a problem situation as one that no prevailing three-term contingency has established as a discriminative stimulus for an action that produces a reinforcer. The final section is concerned with some differences between cognitivistic and behavioral treatments of problem solving.

This paper offers some reflections on the discipline and profession of behavior analysis, as well as on the Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA), on the occasion of the association's 25th anniversary. It is based on a panel session conducted at the 1999 ...

This paper offers some reflections on the discipline and profession of behavior analysis, as well as on the Association for Behavior Analysis (ABA), on the occasion of the association's 25th anniversary. It is based on a panel session conducted at the 1999 convention that included six past presidents of ABA (Donald M. Baer, Judith E. Favell, Sigrid S. Glenn, Philip N. Hineline, Jack Michael, and Edward K. Morris) and its current Executive Director and Secretary-Treasurer (Maria E. Malott). Among the topics addressed were (a) the survival of behavior analysis in university and cultural contexts, (b) the training of behavior-analytic researchers and practitioners, (c) relations between basic and applied research, (d) convergences between behavior analysis and other disciplines, (e) the structure and function of ABA, and (f) the importance of students for the future of the association, the discipline, and the profession. Questions from the audience raised issues concerning the rele...