CN119922024A - Integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for large model-as-a-service - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention relates to the technical field of privacy protection, and discloses an integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for large-model instant service, which comprises the steps of generating a server key pair through set system parameters; the method comprises the steps of establishing a random number list of a user, registering the user to a server through the established zero knowledge proof, a promise value and an applied authority to apply for member authority, issuing an anonymous credential for the user by the server, calculating to obtain the credential after blind removal of an anonymous signature by the user, sending the credential to the server after blind removal of the user to access the server, judging whether the user is still in a member period by the server, if yes, issuing an updated anonymous signature for the user, calculating the updated credential after blind removal of the anonymous signature by the user, and judging whether the updated anonymous signature issued by the server is safe or not. The invention ensures that the authentication information of the same user in different sessions cannot be associated through unlinkeability and anonymity, and can effectively hide the true identity information of the user.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of privacy protection, in particular to an integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for large-model instant service.
Background
Large language models (LLMs, large Language Models) are widely used in various fields in text understanding and generating tasks, and become an important tool for improving production efficiency. With the popularization of large language models, the problem of privacy protection of users is increasingly prominent, and particularly, when users interact with the models, the risk of privacy leakage is significantly increased. Users typically rely on online AI, i.e., services (AIaaS, AI as a Service), provided by large language model service providers for interaction, in which mode the user's identity information, interaction data, and behavioral models may be collected and stored by the service provider. Since service providers can construct detailed user images through data such as user interaction, search records, etc., privacy security of users is a serious challenge.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to realize double protection characteristics of user identity, namely unlinkable property and anonymity, in the registration and authentication stages through a blind signature mechanism, ensure that authentication information of the same user in different sessions cannot be correlated, effectively hide real identity information of the user, and provide an integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method oriented to large models, namely services.
In order to achieve the above object, the embodiment of the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
the integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for the large model as a service comprises the following steps:
step 1, generating a key pair of a server through set system parameters;
step 2, the user registers with the server through the constructed zero knowledge proof to apply for the member permission, the server issues anonymous certificates for the user, and the user calculates the certificates after blind removal of the anonymous signature;
and step3, after blinding the certificate, the user sends the certificate to the server for accessing the server, the server judges whether the user is still in the member period, if so, the updated anonymous signature is issued to the user, and after the user blinds the anonymous signature, the updated certificate is calculated to judge whether the updated anonymous signature issued by the server is safe or not.
Compared with the prior art, the method has the beneficial effects of anonymity, unlinkeability and authentication.
Anonymity, namely when a user registers with a server, the server issues an anonymous signature to the user, before the user uses the anonymous signature to authenticate, blind removing operation is carried out on the anonymous signature to obtain a credential cred, authentication is carried out by using the blinded cred' during authentication, and the user can complete registration and authentication operation without revealing a real identity.
And (3) unlinkability, namely in the registration stage, the system protects the identity information of the user through a zero knowledge proof technology, so that an external attacker cannot establish association with the user. In the authentication process, the system adopts an anonymous authentication protocol based on attributes to ensure that an attacker cannot track the identity of a user through the authentication process, and simultaneously, the server adopts an anonymous signature protection mechanism to ensure that the same user cannot be identified by analyzing different certificates.
Authentication, namely verifying the validity and the authenticity of the user, wherein in the scheme, the server authenticates the user, so that only the legal user can access the service, and the security of the system is fundamentally protected; authentication is the core basis of access control, and only authenticated users can be given corresponding rights, so as to access system resources or execute specific operations. The mechanism effectively prevents illegal users from impersonating and unauthorized access, and provides important guarantee for the security and reliability of the system.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings that are needed in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it being understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present invention and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and other related drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is apparent that the embodiments described are only some embodiments of the present invention, but not all embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present invention generally described and illustrated in the figures herein may be arranged and designed in a wide variety of different configurations. Thus, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the invention, as presented in the figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be made by a person skilled in the art without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the present invention.
It should be noted that like reference numerals and letters refer to like items in the following figures, and thus once an item is defined in one figure, no further definition or explanation thereof is necessary in the following figures. Also, in the description of the present invention, the terms "first," "second," and the like are used merely to distinguish one from another, and are not to be construed as indicating or implying a relative importance or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or operations. In addition, the terms "connected," "coupled," and the like may be used to denote a direct connection between elements, or an indirect connection via other elements.
Example 1:
the invention is realized by the following technical scheme, as shown in figure 1, and the integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for the large model instant service comprises the following steps:
and step 1, generating a key pair of the server through the set system parameters, and constructing a random number list of the user.
Step 1-1, setting parameters:
given the security parameter 1 λ, λ is used to determine the security level of the system and the size of the relevant parameter, e.g. λ determines the bit length of the order p of the cyclic group, yet ensures that the collision resistance of the collision resistant hash function is sufficiently strong.
The server (i.e. large language model server) generates bilinear map e G 1×G2→GT, wherein G 1、G2 and G T are p-order cyclic groups, and G 1 has G, w and G 2 has G, w and G 2 。
The anti-collision hash function H {0,1} → Z p → where Z p represents the integer multiplicative group of modulo p, i.e., the set {1, 2..p-1 }, p being a prime number.
The common parameter is represented as pp= (e, G 1,G2,GT, p, G, w,,H)。
Step 1-2, generating a key:
Server selection (x, y 1,y2,y3,z)←Zp, calculate:
The server generates a private key SK M=(X,y1,y2,y3, z);
Server generated public key 。
Step 1-3, generating a random number list, wherein the random number list is divided into 12 rows according to the number of remaining member days Ld of the user Ui, the number of remaining member days Ld corresponding to each row is [0,30 ], [30,60 ], [60,90 ]), and [330,360 ], the random number list is sequentially represented by types TP1, TP2, and TP12, and the update time of each row is sequentially 1 month, 2 months, and 12 months. In the initial state, the pseudorandom number d sid in the random number list of the user Ui is blank.
Table 1 list of random numbers
And 2, registering the user to the server through the constructed zero knowledge proof to apply for the member permission, issuing an anonymous credential for the user by the server, and calculating to obtain the credential after blind removal of the anonymous signature by the user.
Step 2-1, the user Ui selects a random number t≡z p, and its IDi (number), and calculates the promise value:
Constructing zero knowledge proof:
where Pok is the symbol used to interpret the set.
The authority applied by the user is ACL, the ACL represents the member authority applied by the user, such as a member of the day, a member of the month, a member of the quarter and a member of the year, and the user pays the amount of the corresponding authority.
The user Ui will、The ACL is sent to the server.
Step 2-2, the server receives、After ACL, verify zero knowledge proofIf the verification is successful, the user is a legal user with the corresponding ID. After the zero knowledge proof verification is passed, judging whether the authority applied by the user Ui is matched with the paid amount, if not, changing the authority to ACL 'corresponding to the actual paid amount of the user, generating access days val corresponding to the ACL', and if so, generating days val corresponding to the ACL. Two random numbers (r, u) +.z p are selected, and a pseudo-random number d sid =h (u, lt) is calculated, where Lt is the time of the current registration, H is an anti-collision hash function, let rt= (val, lt). The server then calculates the anonymous signature of the user Ui:
Namely:
The server will D sid, RT are sent to the user Ui.
Step 2-3, the user Ui receives the anonymous signatureAfter that, it needs to be blind-removed, and the user Ui calculates the credential cred:
and verifies the validity of the signature by checking whether the following holds:
Wherein e represents bilinear mapping operation, and the user Ui stores cred, d sid and RT after verification.
And step3, after blinding the certificate, the user sends the certificate to the server for accessing the server, the server judges whether the user is still in the member period, if so, the updated anonymous signature is issued to the user, and after the user blinds the anonymous signature, the updated certificate is calculated to judge whether the updated anonymous signature issued by the server is safe or not.
When the user Ui accesses the large language model server, the question query and the credential cred are sent to the large language model server, and after the server verifies the credential cred of the user Ui, the answer of the question is sent back to the user Ui. In detail:
step 3-1, the user Ui selects three random numbers (α, θ, β) ≡z p, and calculates the blinded credential cred':
Calculating a promise value:
Generating a zero knowledge proof:
The user Ui will be cred, 、D sid, RT, query and the current authentication time Lt' are sent to the server.
Step 3-2, when the server receives the seed,、After d sid and RT, query, lt ', calculating Lt' -lt=d, wherein d represents the number of days of interval between authentication time and registration time, and judging whether d exceeds val;
if d exceeds val, reminding the user that the Ui member is expired and needing to pay again;
If d does not exceed val, then val-d=ld is calculated, where Ld represents the number of days remaining for which the user Ui has access to the server, if 0.ltoreq.Ld <30, then check if pseudo random number d sid in one row of type TP1 in the random number list is present, if present, then this blinded credential cred' is a credential that has been used and refused to provide service, if not present, add d sid to TP1 and provide service, and similarly, if 30.ltoreq.Ld <60, then the same operation is performed in TP2, and so on, if 330.ltoreq.Ld <360, then the same operation is performed in TP 12.
Step 3-3, the server verifies the zero knowledge proofAfter the verification is passed, the server selects two random numbers (ru', k) ++z p and updates d sid,dsid*=H(ru`,Lt),dsid as updated pseudo-random numbers, and calculates updated anonymous signature:
And answer to the query and the updated anonymous signatureD sid, ld is returned to the user Ui.
Step 3-4, the user Ui receives the anonymous signatureThen, blind removing operation is needed to be carried out on the certificate, and the certificate of the certificate is updatedWherein:
The user Ui checks whether the following formula holds:
If so, the user Ui stores the cred x, d sid x and RT, and if not, the anonymous signature issued by the server is problematic, such as tampered, attacked and the like.
In summary, when a user registers with the large language model server, the server anonymously issues an anonymous signature to the user, and before the user uses the anonymous signature to authenticate, blind removal operation is performed on the anonymous signature to obtain a credential. The blind-removed credentials are used for authentication, and a zero knowledge proof is added to the user during authentication to prove the validity of the identity of the user without revealing the true identity of the user, so that anonymous authentication is realized, any link cannot be established between a signature used in the authentication process and the true identity of the user, and the user identity is effectively prevented from being tracked or revealed. By the method, anonymity of the user identity is ensured by the anonymous authentication technology, unlinked performance and authentication efficiency of the user in different interaction scenes are improved, the privacy protection level of the user is remarkably improved by the design, and misuse or disclosure of the user identity information can be effectively prevented especially in high privacy risk scenes such as large model interaction.
Based on an anonymous authentication mechanism (such as zero knowledge proof and anonymous signature) of a randomized credential, a user generates a unique pseudo-identity every time the user accesses, and the identity used by the same user is different in different queries. Even if some inquiry information of the user is acquired, the user cannot be linked to the true identity of the user. The method has the advantages that the privacy of the user is protected, the misuse of the tracking mode and the behavior data of the user identity is prevented, the authentication mechanism is realized based on the blind signature technology, the fact that the identity information and the behavior data of the user cannot be linked or tracked when the user interacts with the large model is ensured, and the problem that the real identity of the user can be revealed by a service provider in the existing large cloud-based language model is effectively solved. The method enables anonymous, unassociated authentication identifications to be used each time a user accesses a large model by dynamically generating unlinked anonymous credentials. The privacy data of the user is protected at a higher level, and meanwhile, the security and the credibility of the large model service are ensured.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the present invention, and the present invention is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art will readily recognize that variations or substitutions are within the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the invention is subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (10)
1. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for the large model as a service is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
step 1, generating a key pair of a server through set system parameters;
step 2, the user registers with the server through the constructed zero knowledge proof to apply for the member permission, the server issues anonymous certificates for the user, and the user calculates the certificates after blind removal of the anonymous signature;
and step3, after blinding the certificate, the user sends the certificate to the server for accessing the server, the server judges whether the user is still in the member period, if so, the updated anonymous signature is issued to the user, and after the user blinds the anonymous signature, the updated certificate is calculated to judge whether the updated anonymous signature issued by the server is safe or not.
2. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for a large model as a service of claim 1, wherein in step 1, the set system parameters include:
Given a security parameter 1 λ, λ is used to determine the security level of the system and the size of the relevant parameters;
The server generates bilinear map e, G 1×G2→GT, wherein G 1、G2 and G T are p-order cyclic groups; the generator of G 1 is G and w, and the generator of G 2 is G and w ;
Selecting an anti-collision hash function H {0,1} → Z p → wherein Z p represents an integer multiplication group of modulo p;
the common parameter is represented as pp= (e, G 1,G2,GT, p, G, w, ,H)。
3. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for a large model as a service as set forth in claim 2, wherein in step 1, the step of generating a key pair of a server through set system parameters includes:
Server selection (x, y 1,y2,y3,z)←Zp, calculate:
The server generates a private key SK M=(X,y1,y2,y3, z);
Server generated public key 。
4. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for a large model as a service as set forth in claim 3, wherein in said step 1, the step of constructing a random number list of the user comprises:
According to the number of remaining membership days Ld of the user Ui, dividing the random number list into 12 rows, wherein the number of remaining membership days Ld corresponding to each row is [0,30 ], [30,60 ], [60,90 ]), and [330,360 ], and the types of the sections in which the number of remaining membership days are located are sequentially expressed by TP1, TP2, & gt, and TP12, and in an initial state, the pseudo random number d sid of each row in the random number list of the user Ui is blank.
5. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for a large model as a service of claim 4, wherein in step 2, the user registers with the server through the constructed zero knowledge proof to apply for the member right, comprising the steps of:
the user Ui selects a random number t++z p, and its own IDi;
Calculating a promise value:
Constructing zero knowledge proof:
wherein Pok is a symbol for interpreting the set;
The authority applied by the user is ACL, the ACL represents the member authority applied by the user, and the user pays the amount of the corresponding authority;
the user Ui will 、The ACL is sent to the server.
6. The integrated large model-as-a-service anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method as set forth in claim 5, wherein in said step 2, the step of issuing an anonymous credential for the user by the server comprises:
the server receives 、After ACL, verify zero knowledge proofIf the verification is successful, the user is a legal user with a corresponding ID;
After the zero knowledge proof verification is passed, judging whether the authority applied by the user Ui is matched with the paid amount, if not, changing the authority to an authority ACL 'corresponding to the actual paid amount of the user, and generating an access number val corresponding to the ACL';
selecting two random numbers (r, u) ≡z p, calculating a pseudo random number d sid =h (u, lt), wherein Lt is the current registration time, H is an anti-collision hash function, let rt= (val, lt);
The server calculates the anonymous signature of the user Ui :
The server willD sid, RT are sent to the user Ui.
7. The integrated large-scale model-as-a-service anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method as set forth in claim 6, wherein in said step 2, the step of computing the credential after blind removal of the anonymous signature by the user comprises:
user Ui receives anonymous signature Then, blind removing operation is carried out on the user, and the user Ui calculates a certificate cred:
and verifies the validity of the signature by checking whether the following holds:
Wherein e represents a bilinear mapping operation;
after passing the authentication the user Ui stores cred, d sid, RT.
8. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for a large model as a service of claim 7, wherein in step 3, the step of sending the credentials to the server for accessing the server after the user blinds the credentials comprises:
The user Ui selects three random numbers (α, θ, β) ++z p;
Calculating a blinded certificate cred':
Calculating a promise value:
Generating a zero knowledge proof:
The user Ui will be cred, 、D sid, RT, question query and the current authentication time Lt' are sent to the server.
9. The integrated large model-as-a-service anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method as set forth in claim 8, wherein in said step 3, the server judges whether the user is still in the membership period, and if so, issues an updated anonymous signature to the user, comprising:
The server receives the cred 、After d sid and RT, query, lt ', calculating Lt' -lt=d, wherein d represents the number of days of interval between authentication time and registration time, and judging whether d exceeds val;
if d exceeds val, reminding the user that the Ui member is expired and needing to pay again;
If d does not exceed val, calculating val-d=ld, wherein Ld represents the number of days remaining for the user Ui to access the server, checking whether a pseudo random number d sid exists in a row of the type of the number of days remaining Ld in the random number list, if so, representing that the blinded credential cred' is a used credential and refusing to provide service, and if not, adding d sid to the type and providing service;
server verification zero knowledge proof After the verification is passed, the server selects two random numbers (ru', k) ++z p to update d sid,dsid*=H(ru`,Lt),dsid as updated pseudo-random numbers;
the server calculates an updated anonymous signature :
And the answer of the question query and the updated anonymous signatureD sid, ld is returned to the user Ui.
10. The integrated anonymous authentication and hierarchical access method for a large model as a service of claim 9, wherein in step 3, after the user blinds the anonymous signature, the step of calculating the updated credential to determine whether the updated anonymous signature issued by the server is secure, comprises:
user Ui receives anonymous signature Then, blind removing operation is carried out on the certificate to update the certificate of the userWherein:
The user Ui checks whether the following formula holds:
if so, the user Ui stores the cred, d sid and RT, and if not, the anonymous signature issued by the server is not safe.
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Application publication date: 20250502 |