Papers by Chris J Flaherty
none, 2025
▲ COMPLEX SWARMING TACTICS are based on the notion drones rhizome manoeuvre over battlespace usin... more ▲ COMPLEX SWARMING TACTICS are based on the notion drones rhizome manoeuvre over battlespace using terrain advantages reaching their target by 'indirect approaches'. Effectively drones achieve in the immediate airspace above an opponent all-round attack options, on multiple surreptitious vectors covering 360o on the plain, and 180o hemispherically. 180 o 360 o Observer's Eye.
none, 2025
Using a number of small flying drones does not change the fundamentals of swarming tactics. In es... more Using a number of small flying drones does not change the fundamentals of swarming tactics. In essence, with the large-scale fielding of small weapon carrying drones, the two altering dynamics are: (1) Humans are physically distanced from the weapons they are using; (2) Small drone use changes Swarming Tactics Geometry, as various attacks are able to fully exploit the 3D space encompassing an opponent. That being said, the phenomenon of a number of tactical entities (in this case small drones) able to buzz an opponent, attacking from multiple vectors complicating the opponent’s ability to counter these varied incoming threats remains a core fundamental of swarming tactics.
none, 2025
This presentation is based on my research into the war in Ukraine, beginning in 2022 with the inv... more This presentation is based on my research into the war in Ukraine, beginning in 2022 with the invasion, till currently. It attempts to identify and summarize current trends, which can be seen, emerging from a broad range of academic, reporters, and social media influencer's commentaries. The purpose is to stimulate defence, policy and historical analysis. The opinions expressed in this presentation are the authors.
none, 2025
Written using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) this paper presents a summary of how Ukraine, sinc... more Written using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) this paper presents a summary of how Ukraine, since 2022, has developed access to a fleet of 50 SAR: Synthetic Aperture Radar satellites.
none, 2025
Ukraine's Military Forces, like all contemporary militaries, rely on several Space-based capabili... more Ukraine's Military Forces, like all contemporary militaries, rely on several Space-based capabilities providing vital support for a range of targeting, navigation, and communications services in terms of directing strikes and battlefield movement. Uniquely, much of Ukrainian Space access is dependent on a diversified patchwork of civil third-party providers 12 , which arose early in the war, and critical targeting information provided by Allies, who have their own Space Forces. Building an in-house Space Forces Capability for Ukraine, which would allow for the integration of targeting, navigation, and communications services into a comprehensive defence and offensive architecture would be the next maturing step in the transformation of Ukraine's military forces from their prewar , and current posture. Critically, Ukraine's key strategic disadvantage is its ongoing reliance on Allies for Spacebased communications coverage, and missile early warning systems. The next extension of this, will be fielding its own strategic weaponry in the form of long-range missile complexes that will require satellite support. Currently, Russia despite its evolving military problems still has a major advantage in terms of its military satellite fleet, such as its reconnaissance satellite programs: Persona satellites, which are high-resolution optical reconnaissance craft designed for detailed imaging; and, Bars-M satellites used for cartography and wide-area reconnaissance with lower resolution imagery. There is also the Liana satellite system, a Space-based intelligence program used for electronic warfare and target designation. Russia's Space-based military assets ensure accurate navigation through the GLONASS system and enhance battlefield situational awareness through Persona, significantly strengthening high-precision weaponry and operational awareness 3. Publicly enunciated in early 2022, Ukraine's Space Access Strategy, has been securing three essential Space services pillars: Pillar 1: Remote Sensing Services Pillar 2: Communications Services Pillar 3: Autonomous Capacity to bring this infrastructure into orbit Arguably, Ukraine's Space Access Strategy has reached in 2025 'Pillar 3', in terms of its armed forces' modernization and capability expansion in missile armament, missile defence, and utilizing Space-based support; where it can move away from dependency on the major Space Powers, developing its own capabilities for it to achieve Space Situational Awareness, and be able to monitor opponent Space activity that could impact on its National Security. It has been recently reported that a programme is being initiated, to seek funding for, "[a] … dual-use satellite constellation, dubbed Intermarsat … [potentially] … comprised of more than 70 small satellites in sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of about 500 kilometres (310 miles). It would provide daily revisits across the belt between the Baltic and the Mediterranean Sea, covering countries as far north as Finland and Estonia and as far south as Bulgaria." 4 The potential size of the constellation could reduce the effectiveness of Russian Antisatellite threats having a number of redundancies, to distribute functions across several satellites in face of threats, such as: (1) Rendezvous and capture technologies; (2) Direct ascent missile attacks; (3) Nuclear space mines detonations in orbit.
none, 2025
Written using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) this paper overviews the Ukrainian 13th Khartiia B... more Written using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) this paper overviews the Ukrainian 13th Khartiia Brigade's use of ground and air drones in Combined Arms Attacks over 2024, and 2025.
none, 2025
Written using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) this paper overviews how Ukraine gained space acce... more Written using Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) this paper overviews how Ukraine gained space access during the war with Russia over 2022 to 2025. The paper then looks at a notional transition from Ukraine as a Space User, that could develop into a Mid-Level Space Power, with a Space Command as a military branch. The role of such a potential future entity is assessed against the background of the development of the three pillars of Ukrainian Space Power.
none, 2025
Recent Russian Military Blogger commentaries, state Russian forces in Ukraine have adopted a New ... more Recent Russian Military Blogger commentaries, state Russian forces in Ukraine have adopted a New Rapid Attack Drone Assault Tactic, where dismounted assault infantry, have started bringing FPV drones with them substituting for precision artillery fire: This tactic allows the drone operators (who stay behind) to engage targets much faster.
none, 2025
Recent reporting on the 2.3% possibility of an asteroid – designated Asteroid 2024 YR4, of hittin... more Recent reporting on the 2.3% possibility of an asteroid – designated Asteroid 2024 YR4, of hitting the Earth in 2032, raises the notion of Planetary Defence as a model for study.
none, 2023
This overview looks at three technology examples that can independently create energy for use, an... more This overview looks at three technology examples that can independently create energy for use, and change the fundamentals of Military Energy Geography: how Human military activity is spread over the landscape, by using: (1) Mobile Nuclear Power Plant; (2) Robotic Mule; (3) Space-Based Solar Laser System Transferring Power onto the Earth’s Surface, creating Multiple Mobile Independent Energy Clusters supporting highly distributed Electrified Military Forces over a Hyperextended Battlefront.
The analysis of vulnerabilities in large complex spaces is fundamentally problematic. The lack of... more The analysis of vulnerabilities in large complex spaces is fundamentally problematic. The lack of capacity to generate a threat assessment merely exacerbates this problem. Lacking as well, in current literature is a developed methodology. To overcome this problem, we propose an approach using multi-agent modelling, which is also melded with three dimensional (3D) tactical understandings. Our approach builds on a microsimulation decision support tool, which was developed for a behavioural simulation of CBRN events. Microsimulation is based on the individual; who as an individual has a number of attributes, and which are stochastic (when repeated within an attribute). This approach is then enveloped. The simulations approach is intended for simulation of global and social controls and is designed to deal effectively with separate population groups. Each group has rules based on the group's behaviour and attributes, and complex scenarios can be built very simply. This therefore, enables analysis of emergent group behaviours and patterns. Our approach is akin to chemical or fire spread quantification. It views particle spread analysis as synonymous with complex movement (or stationary location) of many active agents within a complex 3D environment. This approach, we believe is needed to 'solve' the counter terrorism problem presented by scenarios such as the 2007 Haymarket attack; such as, how to analyse such events, as well as develop effective interdiction. A discrete behaviour model approach is suggested. This approach through repeated simulation (within the same parameters) should build up a statistical pattern of domain behaviour. As well, information on the outcome of changing behaviour can also be logged. Therefore, individual outcomes can be matched against real-time data to give best prediction of eventual outcomes, and the range of future strategies based on closest approach to reality. Taking this approach, potential targets could then be given random attributes including movement, size, speed, destination, and degree of deception being used in behaviour. Superimposing targets from known information and still building in random attributes about what is not known, will allow forward prediction with back-correction over time as information becomes more available. As well, failure rates and other assumptions could also be gradually relaxed, and this will allow for continuous assessment of assumptions as real data becomes available.
Lecture Notes in Energy, 2013
The economic approach to energy security tends to be descriptive and
frequently concerned with ... more The economic approach to energy security tends to be descriptive and
frequently concerned with the price and supply measures of energy security.
Approaches such as these, however, are not connected with the much broader
national security and foreign relations policy realms. As well, the national security
approach to energy security allows incorporation with Critical National Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CNIP) concepts, such as 3D vulnerability analysis. This method
can be used to collect physical infrastructure vulnerability information, which can
be used to identify potential threats to energy security (as a subset of national
security).
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Small Drone Warfare Fundamentals – has been written to help interested but inexpert readers under... more Small Drone Warfare Fundamentals – has been written to help interested but inexpert readers understand the tactical fundamentals of small drone warfare on the battlefield. Part of a broader project to address the current gap between Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) on small drone uses in current warfare; and how many in the community and military may have limited exposure, education, or experience in small drone uses on the battlefield.
Written with a view to bridge the gap in understanding small drone uses on the battlefield capabilities in the current Ukrainian War Ecosystem, which are viewed as overly technical, or too complex issues underpinning small drone uses; or are specifically classified to discuss openly in public, which limits a broader understanding of the warfighting fundamentals involved.
OODA, 2012
This research monograph - Dangerous Minds, examines the relationship between the individual belie... more This research monograph - Dangerous Minds, examines the relationship between the individual beliefs, behaviours, and tactics of an attacker. It was developed out of work, following human factors research for a ‘Scripted Agent Based Microsimulation Project’, which is currently being developed at the University of Wollongong (NSW, Australia). Another contributing factor to the development of this research monograph has been discussion posts on the GroupIntel Network.
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This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically ... more This paper looks at Infantry Drone Units' organization and roles that have developed organically in the war in Ukraine ecosystem as a response to emerging use of the technology. In 2018, it was anticipated, "a future possibility for lone combatants on foot to operate one or possible more small UAVs as an extension of his or her own means to combat an opponent." 1 In a recent report about United States Army soldiers from the 1st Squadron War Eagles (2nd Cavalry Regiment), the Human factors element in the emerging use of drones is central to using the technology: "Our soldiers are observing trends on the battlefield. They're then seeing where we have capability gaps, and they're finding low-cost solutions to innovate" 2. The type of role change in basic Infantry skills, are: "Our soldiers are 3D printing, they're doing basic soldering, they're doing basic coding using code like Python or C++ to create low-cost solutions to tactical problems they are seeing" 3. In a recent interview with an Escadrone spokesman 4 , they stated: "FPV kamikaze is about pilots, not about drones" 5. This is because: "using an FPV drone effectively requires considerable skill … flying an FPV drone is not so hard. But if you want to use it like a weapon, you have train for a month … because it's very difficult to hit a moving target at high speed." 6 It should be noted, while Human factors are a key element in the use of drones, there is also an emerging substitution with Artificial Intelligence with this entity standing-in for the Human pilot. In comparison to a United States Switchblade 300 drone, "it can lock on to moving targets and track them automatically" 7. The same technology may reach FPV kamikazes drones soon, "thanks to new AI chips for drones, but at present it is down to operator skill" 8 .
none, 2024
This paper looks at the application of Information Intensified Combat Methods, and Acupuncture St... more This paper looks at the application of Information Intensified Combat Methods, and Acupuncture Strategy to conducting Orbital Warfare. Information Intensified Combat Methods effectively become greater Space Situational Awareness-Space Domain Awareness, which is essential for specifically identifying opponent satellites to target. The attack method, follows the Acupuncture Strategy model using grappling satellites with robotic arms, in Rendezvous Operations with uncooperative target satellites. The actual attack methodology is a Co-Orbital Antisatellite Weapons attack that can deliver an 'acupuncture prick' from an intrusive probe disabling the opponent satellite. In this paper, ground (or air launched) to space Antisatellite missiles is not considered. Currently, "the People's Republic of China, Russia, India, and the United States have tested Antisatellite missiles capable of reaching Low Earth Orbit." 1 While these weapons have dominated space war concepts, these can be bracketed between two events, beginning in 1985, when the United States used its ASM-135A to destroy a real satellite, and 2021, when Kosmos 1408 was successfully destroyed by a Russian Antisatellite missile. Debris created by this weapon use establishes a lingering space threat to all. This may signal ultimate redundancy, except where a rogue state, or extremist entity is concerned, who seek to deny space access and use, as they have little use for it themselves. CHANG MENGXIONG THEOREM In the 1990s, Chang Mengxiong, "a noted Chinese military theorist" 2 , was considered a leading advocate for China's rapid pursuit of information warfare capabilities 3. Mengxiong commenting on 'information-intensified' combat methods, likened these to-"A Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement. By contrast, noninformation-intensified combat methods are like fights between villagers in which heads are broken and blood flows, but it is hard to distinguish the winner from the loser." 4 Using the analogy of acupuncture for fighting an Information Intensified Combat the objective is to use a specific strike against a mega-infrastructure site, such that the whole operation of the site is disrupted. In order for the small-scale attack to
Australian Army Journal, 2003
In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mim... more In the 21st century, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot afford to ignore the role that mimicry will play in contemporary conflict, particularly in unconventional or asymmetric warfare.
The reproduction of Anzac symbolism
Journal of Australian Studies, May 1, 1989
... cit., John Masefield, Gallipoli, London, 1916; E Ashmead-Bartlett, Three Impressions', i... more ... cit., John Masefield, Gallipoli, London, 1916; E Ashmead-Bartlett, Three Impressions', in the All-Australia Memorial, Melbourne, 1920. ... For (mostly) plain diction, see Gammage, The Broken Years, 1974,passim; Patsy Adam-Smith, The Anzacs, Melbourne, 1979, chaps 10, 12, 13 ...
none, 2024
The Land-Centric view of Ukraine's strategy measures success in terms of simple transactional ter... more The Land-Centric view of Ukraine's strategy measures success in terms of simple transactional terms of occupied land seizure-this is a fundamental mistake. The Ukrainian 2024 Active Defence Mode, achieves three strategic outcomes: (1) It ties-down significantly larger Russian Ground Forces conventionally amassing attempting a breakthrough at a perceived weak point at the Line of Contact. ◄ Current Ukrainian Deep Battle Model fought in the context of Modern Positional Warfare (Zaluzhnyi, 2023), and the 2024 Active Defence Mode. Russian Ground Forces amass to breakthrough at a decisive point in the Ukrainian Line of Contact, and drive into a Killing Ground, where Ukrainian Forces enjoy drone dominance of the Immediate Airspace Above the Killing Ground (an Overhead Attack Surface), sandwiching Russian Ground Forces between two attack surfaces (the ground surface is saturated with mines). Simultaneously longrange artillery strike key targets deep within Russian rear echelons destroying artillery, air defence, communications, command and logistics organization. Ukrainian Partisan Activity Ukrainian Naval Drones warfare and strikes on Russian ports functionally defeats the Black Sea Fleet and opens access to the Black Sea. Russian Black Sea Fleet retreats Mid-range air, artillery, drone, and rocket attacks: Long-range air and missile strikes: Russian Logistics Centre Overhead Attack Surface KZ
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Papers by Chris J Flaherty
frequently concerned with the price and supply measures of energy security.
Approaches such as these, however, are not connected with the much broader
national security and foreign relations policy realms. As well, the national security
approach to energy security allows incorporation with Critical National Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CNIP) concepts, such as 3D vulnerability analysis. This method
can be used to collect physical infrastructure vulnerability information, which can
be used to identify potential threats to energy security (as a subset of national
security).
Written with a view to bridge the gap in understanding small drone uses on the battlefield capabilities in the current Ukrainian War Ecosystem, which are viewed as overly technical, or too complex issues underpinning small drone uses; or are specifically classified to discuss openly in public, which limits a broader understanding of the warfighting fundamentals involved.