Game Theory and Applications

Key Features

@introbul:Key Features
@bul:* Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory
* Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm
* Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology
* Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists

Description

Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions.

Additional details

  • Published: 1990
  • Imprint: Academic Press
  • Language: English
  • ISBN: 978-0-12-370182-4
  • DOI: 10.1016/C2009-0-21615-1

Actions for selected chapters

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Supergames

SYLVAIN SORIN

Pages 46-63

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Repeated Games

JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS

Pages 77-130

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The Shapley Value

ROBERT AUMANN

Pages 158-165

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Advances in Value Theory

SERGIU HART

Pages 166-175

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Consistency

MICHAEL MASCHLER

Pages 183-186

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The Consistency Principle

WILLIAM THOMSON

Pages 187-215

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Information Transmission

SHMUEL ZAMIR, MORTON I. KAMIEN and YAIR TAUMAN

Pages 273-281

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Developments in Stable Set Theory

WILLIAM F. LUCAS

Pages 300-316

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Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information

SHAUL MISHAL, DAVID SCHMEIDLER and ITAI SENED

Pages 336-357

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Selected Abstracts from the Proceedings of the 1987 International Conference, Ohio State University

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    On the Core of the Assignment Game

    MICHEL L. BALINSKI and DAVID GALE

    Pages 373-374

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    An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking

    STEPHEN ELLNER and AVI SHMIDA

    Pages 377-379

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    Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues

    RON HOLZMAN, EHUD LEHRER and NATHAN LINIAL

    Page 384

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    The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study

    ROY RADNER and ANDREW SCHOTTER

    Page 407

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    Values of Large Finite Games

    MYRNA HOLTZ WOODERS and WILLIAM R. ZAME

    Pages 416-417

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Tatsuro Ichiishi

Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

Abraham Neyman

Institute for Decision Sciences, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New YorkThe Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel

Yair Tauman

Department of Economics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OhioTel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel