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Table 1. Companies with extreme earnings management coefficients Analyzing the earnings management variable we found there were 12 observations with extreme values, i.e., excessively large values in relation to the other observations in the data set, as shown in Table 1 below. In the years when these extreme values occurred, the independent auditors’ reports all expressed no reservation. Besides , only one of the companies (Aco Altona) was audited by one of the Big Four (Ernest & Young Auditores Independentes S.C.). In the years before and after the extreme value occurrence the auditor was the same, except for Bicicletas Caloi S.A., which changed the auditor in the year of the extreme value. We performed a descriptive analysis with and without these outliers. The results showed that the earnings management coefficients of the companies were on average higher when analyzed with the extreme values. In terms of relative dispersion, the earnings management values were more dispersed when analyzed with outliers, as expected. The highest and lowest earnings management values were 28.4936 and 4.3773e-05, respectively, as shown in Table 2.

Table 1 Companies with extreme earnings management coefficients Analyzing the earnings management variable we found there were 12 observations with extreme values, i.e., excessively large values in relation to the other observations in the data set, as shown in Table 1 below. In the years when these extreme values occurred, the independent auditors’ reports all expressed no reservation. Besides , only one of the companies (Aco Altona) was audited by one of the Big Four (Ernest & Young Auditores Independentes S.C.). In the years before and after the extreme value occurrence the auditor was the same, except for Bicicletas Caloi S.A., which changed the auditor in the year of the extreme value. We performed a descriptive analysis with and without these outliers. The results showed that the earnings management coefficients of the companies were on average higher when analyzed with the extreme values. In terms of relative dispersion, the earnings management values were more dispersed when analyzed with outliers, as expected. The highest and lowest earnings management values were 28.4936 and 4.3773e-05, respectively, as shown in Table 2.

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Table 2. Earnings management coefficients of companies with and without extreme observations, far the nerind fram 1997 ton 7007 Table 3 shows the results of the companies’ earnings management coefficients according to the characteristics selected for the study. There was no significant difference in the conclusions with our without the extreme values in the data set. Therefore, to construct Figures 1 to 3 we removed the 12 outliers (presented in Table 1) with earnings management coefficients between 1 and 28.
Table 2. Earnings management coefficients of companies with and without extreme observations, far the nerind fram 1997 ton 7007 Table 3 shows the results of the companies’ earnings management coefficients according to the characteristics selected for the study. There was no significant difference in the conclusions with our without the extreme values in the data set. Therefore, to construct Figures 1 to 3 we removed the 12 outliers (presented in Table 1) with earnings management coefficients between 1 and 28.
Table 3. Earnings management with and without atypical data, according to the characteristics
Table 3. Earnings management with and without atypical data, according to the characteristics
Figure 1. Earnings management of companies in periods when the auditor was and was not changed in the period from 1997 to 2007.
Figure 1. Earnings management of companies in periods when the auditor was and was not changed in the period from 1997 to 2007.
Figure 2. Earnings management of companies according to the reason for changing the auditor in the period from 1997 to 2007.
Figure 2. Earnings management of companies according to the reason for changing the auditor in the period from 1997 to 2007.
Figure 3. Earnings management of companies according to the classification of the independent auditor in the period from 1997 to 2007. Figure 3. Earnings management of companies according to the classification of the independent
Figure 3. Earnings management of companies according to the classification of the independent auditor in the period from 1997 to 2007. Figure 3. Earnings management of companies according to the classification of the independent
Table 4 - Estimates of the parameters of the regression model by the method of Da Silva. 5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Table 4 - Estimates of the parameters of the regression model by the method of Da Silva. 5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
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