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Table 7. Heteroscedasticity Tests Table 7 shows the results of the heteroscedasticity tests computed.

Table 7 Heteroscedasticity Tests Table 7 shows the results of the heteroscedasticity tests computed.

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Table 1. Measurement of Variables
Table 1. Measurement of Variables
3.2 Model Specification The study model was adapted from Karaibrahimglu (2013). Unlike that of Karaibrahimglu (2013), this study uses 5 measures of corporate governance and 2 control variables to assess their impact on the industry specialization dimension of auditor choice of non-financial firms in Nigeria. The functional representation form of the linear relationship between the independent and dependent variable can be presented as follows:
3.2 Model Specification The study model was adapted from Karaibrahimglu (2013). Unlike that of Karaibrahimglu (2013), this study uses 5 measures of corporate governance and 2 control variables to assess their impact on the industry specialization dimension of auditor choice of non-financial firms in Nigeria. The functional representation form of the linear relationship between the independent and dependent variable can be presented as follows:
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables This section presents the descriptive statistics for continuous variables of the data used for the study. The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in table 2.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables This section presents the descriptive statistics for continuous variables of the data used for the study. The results of the descriptive statistics are presented in table 2.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variable Of the 385 data/firm observations, 335 (87%) show the presence of institutional owners while institutional investors were absent in 50 observations (13%). According to DeFond et al., (2000), this circumstance of monopolist shareholding has essentially usually led to poor corporate governance practices and raised serious concerns by investors, professionals, regulators, and the public. This is typical of the corporate environment in Nigeria, as reported by Soyemi, et al (2020).
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variable Of the 385 data/firm observations, 335 (87%) show the presence of institutional owners while institutional investors were absent in 50 observations (13%). According to DeFond et al., (2000), this circumstance of monopolist shareholding has essentially usually led to poor corporate governance practices and raised serious concerns by investors, professionals, regulators, and the public. This is typical of the corporate environment in Nigeria, as reported by Soyemi, et al (2020).
Table 4. Correlation Matrix From table 4, it is evidenced that board size (BS) is positively correlated with industry specialization at a 1% level of significance. Board Independence (BI) is negatively correlated with industry specialization but not significant. The size of the audit committee (SAC) is positively
Table 4. Correlation Matrix From table 4, it is evidenced that board size (BS) is positively correlated with industry specialization at a 1% level of significance. Board Independence (BI) is negatively correlated with industry specialization but not significant. The size of the audit committee (SAC) is positively
Table 5. VIF Estimates
Table 5. VIF Estimates
Table 6. Multivariate Regression Results for Pooled, Fixed, and Random Effects OLS First is the determination of the estimates upon which the study is based. There are three models (pooled, fixed, and random effects), each with its estimates. The L-M test assists in comparing the pooled and random effects, while the Hausman test compares fixed and random effects. Specifically,
Table 6. Multivariate Regression Results for Pooled, Fixed, and Random Effects OLS First is the determination of the estimates upon which the study is based. There are three models (pooled, fixed, and random effects), each with its estimates. The L-M test assists in comparing the pooled and random effects, while the Hausman test compares fixed and random effects. Specifically,
Table 8. Multivariate Regression Results for Pooled, Fixed and Random Effects OLS (Robust) The results as shown in table 8 clearly show one of the great advantages of panel data as it has both time and cross-sectional dimensions. This is evidenced in the estimates as they appear not to be
Table 8. Multivariate Regression Results for Pooled, Fixed and Random Effects OLS (Robust) The results as shown in table 8 clearly show one of the great advantages of panel data as it has both time and cross-sectional dimensions. This is evidenced in the estimates as they appear not to be
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