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Epistemology

Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception

Profile image of David De BruijnDavid De Bruijn

2022, The Southern Journal of Philosophy

https://doi.org/10.1111/SJP.12458
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30 pages

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Abstract

In recent work, Scott Soames (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this paper, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section (1), in section (2) I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks, focusing on Hanks’ version. In section (3) I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section (4) provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section (5) explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section (6) I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section (7) I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition.

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Related papers

Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception (Pre-Print)
David De Bruijn

Southern Journal of Philosophy

have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks's version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition.

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"The Unity of Perceptual Content"
Indrek Reiland

Philosophical Quarterly, 2024

Naïve Realists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious relation to an object and its property-instances. In contrast, Representationalists hold that it is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common versions of Representationalism take perceptual content to be either general (Generalism) or singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism) (Schellenberg 2018). Particularism is explicitly motivated by its ability to capture certain Naïve Realist insights and it would be genuine progress if it were the best version of Representationalism. Then the debate between Naïve Realism and Representationalism would reduce to the debate over Disjunctivism. In this paper I show that Particularism faces a version of the problem of the Unity of Perceptual Content. Namely, its supporters haven’t told us how objects can be bound together with property-instances into a content such that it represents them and has accuracy-conditions. Furthermore, I argue that Particularists face an in-principle obstacle in solving it. In contrast, Attributionists can say that objects are bound together with properties into a content because the latter are attributed to the former. This establishes Attributionism as the only Representationalist game in town. But Attributionism can’t capture all Naïve Realist insights that the Particularists are after. Thus, the debate between Naïve Realism and Representationalism doesn’t reduce to the debate over Disjunctivism.

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Perception and Content
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The Unity of Perception
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'The Unity of Perception is a splendid achievement. It fuses the representational, phenomenal, and epistemic dimensions of perception into a coherent whole, bound together by their common basis in the exercise of perceptual capacities. Central to the account is Schellenberg's broadly Fregean theory of perceptual content, which assigns a pivotal role to modes of presentation (MOPs). Schellenberg develops the theory in impressive detail, applying it to a wide range of cases. ' Michael Rescorla, UCLA, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 'Schellenberg's excellent book will undoubtedly have a wide audience among philosophers of mind and epistemologists. Among other virtues, it offers (i) innovative and plausible arguments for the superiority of representationalist theories of perception over disjunctivist and naive realist theories, (ii) the first systematic attempt to develop the view that the contents of perceptual states are robustly particular, with entities like Hillary Clinton and that table serving as their constituents, and (iii) a sustained defense of the idea that our concepts of perceptual evidence are externalist in character. The book is unique in the current literature in seeking accounts of the metaphysical and epistemological dimensions of perception that are mutually reinforcing. ' Christopher Hill, Brown University 'The Unity of Perception offers a grand synoptic vision of how perception, consciousness and knowledge fit together. It is a remarkable achievement . . . there is every reason for philosophers with an interest in mind or epistemology to read The Unity of Perception. ' Alex Byrne, MIT, Analysis 'Capacities are powerful predictive, explanatory tools for theorizing about subjects, minds, and performance. According to The Unity of Perception, capacities anchor a systematic, far-reaching account of perception and perceptual consciousness. ' Casey O'Callaghan, Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 'The Unity of Perception is an ambitious and wide-ranging book-one that presents a unified account and then uses it to address Big Questions about perception . . . Schellenberg' s proposals are important, and will play a role in future discussion of these matters. ' Jonathan Cohen, UCSD, Analysis 'Rich and rewarding. ' Matthew McGrath, Rutgers University, Analysis 'The Unity of Perception is an interesting and thought-provoking book. The central view-capacitism-and its broad implications for philosophy of perception, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science make this book a valuable contribution to anyone working on perception, and I have no doubt that it will draw a great deal of well-deserved attention. '

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The Unity of Consciousness, Within Subjects and Between Subjects
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The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such 'between-subjects unity'. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of 'experience-sharing', in which the same token experience belongs to more than one subject. The second argument, based on the phenomenological claim that unified experiences have interdependent phenomenal characters, I show to rest on an equivocation. Finally, the third argument accuses between-subjects unity of being unimaginable, or more broadly a formal possibility corresponding to nothing we can make sense of. I argue that the familiar experience of perceptual co-presentation gives us an adequate phenomenological grasp on what between-subjects unity might be like.

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