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Psychology
Cognitive Science

Perception and problem solving

Profile image of Sune Vork SteffensenSune Vork Steffensen
https://doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/H6A7R
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13 pages

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Abstract

We discuss a suggestion, made by Harry Heft, that Gibson's ecological approach to perception is compatible with the theory of distributed cognition. We focus on the domain of problem solving. We provide examples of problems in which perception plays a constitutive role in the finding of a solution. We conclude that grounding distributed cognition theory in Gibson's account of direct perception offers a promising avenue for future work seeking to understand human behavior across social and higher cognitive domains.

Key takeaways
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  1. Integrating Gibson's ecological approach with distributed cognition enhances understanding of perception in problem solving.
  2. Heft's work contextualizes Gibson’s theory within historical and social frameworks, expanding its applicability.
  3. The 17 animals problem illustrates how physical manipulation aids perceptual problem solving, with 41% success in hands-on conditions.
  4. Natural mapping in design ensures intuitive user interactions, as seen with stove knobs and navigation maps.
  5. Future research should investigate the interplay of perception, problem solving, and social interaction in various contexts.
Figures (5)
Fig. 1: The layout of the four circles representing enclosures for animals, (a) before and (b) after the distributed the animals to form a successful solution. participant’s manipulation of the bottom left enclosure.
Fig. 1: The layout of the four circles representing enclosures for animals, (a) before and (b) after the distributed the animals to form a successful solution. participant’s manipulation of the bottom left enclosure.
Fig. 2: The participant noticing the overlap: (a) she has just placed the left enclosure down and begins a
Fig. 2: The participant noticing the overlap: (a) she has just placed the left enclosure down and begins a
Fig. 3: (a) a right triangle; (b) a visual illustration of the Pythagorean theorem: area c’ is equal to the sum of
Fig. 3: (a) a right triangle; (b) a visual illustration of the Pythagorean theorem: area c’ is equal to the sum of
Fig. 4: two configurations for knobs on a stovetop with four burners: (a) the two-dimensional burner two-dimensional configuration of burners in the configuration of the knobs (images from Wikimedia
Fig. 4: two configurations for knobs on a stovetop with four burners: (a) the two-dimensional burner two-dimensional configuration of burners in the configuration of the knobs (images from Wikimedia
Fig. 5: two campus maps at Southern Denmark University, situated on opposite sides of the same window. represen at the to ed on the map and the configuration of the environment around them. Orienting the map so that north is p is not necessarily the best option, from the viewer’s point of view. In fact, putting north at the top usually presents the viewer with a new problem: the viewer is now required to ‘mentally rotate’ the map in some way so t map is p hat it corresponds to the environment. (There is an exception to this rule. In the special case where the aced on a south-facing surface, the north-up orientation requires no rotation, for reasons that will become ace bes] oes) nap is placed on a south-facing surface, the north-up orientation requires no rotation, for reasons that will become way so that it corresponds to the environment. (There is an exception to this rule. In the special case where the The second option is to orient the map so that what is at the top of the map represents the part of the
Fig. 5: two campus maps at Southern Denmark University, situated on opposite sides of the same window. represen at the to ed on the map and the configuration of the environment around them. Orienting the map so that north is p is not necessarily the best option, from the viewer’s point of view. In fact, putting north at the top usually presents the viewer with a new problem: the viewer is now required to ‘mentally rotate’ the map in some way so t map is p hat it corresponds to the environment. (There is an exception to this rule. In the special case where the aced on a south-facing surface, the north-up orientation requires no rotation, for reasons that will become ace bes] oes) nap is placed on a south-facing surface, the north-up orientation requires no rotation, for reasons that will become way so that it corresponds to the environment. (There is an exception to this rule. In the special case where the The second option is to orient the map so that what is at the top of the map represents the part of the

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References (25)

  1. Baggs, E. (2021). All affordances are social: Foundations of a Gibsonian social ontology. Ecological Psychology, 33(3-4):257-278. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10407413.2021.1965477
  2. Ball, L. J., & Ormerod, T. C. (2000). Putting ethnography to work: the case for a cognitive ethnography of design. International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 53(1), 147-168. doi: https://doi.org/10.1006/ijhc.2000.0372
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  24. Vallée-Tourangeau, F., Steffensen, S. V., Vallée-Tourangeau, G., & Sirota, M. (2016). Insight with hands and things. Acta Psychologica, 170, 195-205. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2016.08.006
  25. Vicente, K. J. & Burns, C. M. (1996). Evidence for direct perception from cognition in the wild. Ecological Psychology, 8(3):269-280.

FAQs

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How does direct perception contribute to problem solving in humans?add

The research shows that problem solving often relies on perceiving solutions through structured ambient energy, as seen in the 17 animals problem where physical manipulation led to participants finding solutions.

What role does material representation play in problem-solving outcomes?add

Experiments revealed that participants using physical objects had a 41% success rate solving problems, compared to none for those using digital representation, highlighting the importance of tactile interaction.

How does the design of navigation maps affect user comprehension?add

Maps oriented to a forward-up perspective eliminate the need for mental rotation, enhancing user understanding, as evidenced in navigation systems that update to show forward as up.

What insights do everyday objects, like stove knobs, provide about design and cognition?add

Effective designs that maintain natural mappings improve user interactions, ensuring safety and functionality; traditional designs that disregard spatial relations struggle with user satisfaction.

In what ways can ecological psychology inform cognitive theory?add

Integrating Gibsonian principles with distributed cognition reveals that perceptual understanding is foundational for cognitive processes, demystifying how learning and language interact with problem solving.

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