Reply to Sullivan

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 2020

Temporaryism---the view that not always everything always exists---comes in two main versions: presentism and expansionism (aka the growing block theory of time). Both versions of the view are commonly formulated using the notion of being present, which we, among others, find problematic. Expansionism is also sometimes accused of requiring extraordinary conceptual tools for its formulation. In this paper, we put forward systematic characterisations of presentism and expansionism which involve neither the notion of being present nor unfamiliar conceptual tools. These characterisations are full blown logics, each logic comprising an axiomatic proof system and an intuitive semantics with respect to which the system is both sound and complete.

Philosophical Studies, 2015

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2003

In response to a recent challenge that the New B-theory of Time argues invalidly from the claim that tensed sentences have tenseless truth conditions to the conclusion that temporal reality is tenseless, I argue that while early B-theorists may have relied on some such inference, New B-theorists do not. Giving tenseless truth conditions for tensed sentences is not intended to prove that temporal reality is tenseless. Rather, it is intended to undermine the A-theorist’s move from claims about the irreducibility of tensed language to the conclusion that temporal reality must be tensed. I then examine how A-theorists have used facts about language in attempting to establish their conclusions about the nature of temporal reality. I take the recent work of William Lane Craig and argue that he implicitly and illicitly moves from facts about temporal language to his conclusion that temporal reality is tensed.

In: K. Jaszczolt & L. de Saussure, eds, 2013, Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 193-209

2019

This paper argues that A.N. Prior’s invention of tense-logic constitutes a return of medieval logic in the philosophy of time. The argument proceeds from an analysis of W.V. Quine and P.W. Strawson’s 1953 discussion about the inability of formal logic to analyse the tenses of ordinary language. Recent discoveries in the A.N. Prior archive at the Bodleian Library in Oxford reveal that J.J.C. Smart, in a letter to Prior, brought up their discussion in his rejection of Prior’s invention of tense-logic. The correspondence will be discussed in terms of the importance of Prior’s discovery of tense-logic and the presentation of this as a solution to the problem discussed by Strawson and Quine in The Syntax of Time Distinctions (1958, [9]). Recent discoveries reveal a close connection between this discussion and Prior’s discussion of future contingency in Diodoran Modality (1955, [7]). These discoveries support the conclusion of this paper, which argues that Quine’s insistence that modern l...

Analytic Philosophy, 2019

David Lewis sells modal realism as a package that includes an eternalist view of time. There is, of course, nothing that ties together the thesis that modality should be analyzed in terms of "concrete" possibilia with the view that non-present things exist. In this paper I develop a theory I call modal realist presentism that is a combination of modal realism and presentism, and argue that is has compelling answers to some of the main objections to presentism, including the arguments from (i) singular propositions, (ii) cross-temporal relations, and (iii) truthmaking. Toward the end, I compare modal realist presentism favorably to some similar theories, including Bigelow's modal theory of time, Williamson's theory of the ex-concrete, and Dainton's theory of many-worlds presentism.

Synthese, 2022

It has been argued recently that one major difficulty facing the A-theory of time consists in the view's failure to provide a satisfactory account of the passage of time. Critics have objected that this particular charge is premised on an unduly strong conception of temporal passage, and that the argument does not go through on alternative, less demanding conceptions of passage. The resulting dialectical stalemate threatens to prove intractable, given the notorious elusiveness of the notion of temporal passage. Here I argue that there is progress to be made in this regard. The argument from passage takes issue with a certain feature of the standard versions of the A-theory that is in fact problematic independently of worries about temporal passage. To illustrate this, I present a new argument, the argument from comprehensiveness, which demonstrates that the standard A-theoretic account of temporal reality is inadequate, even if it is granted that it can accommodate passage.

The Journal of Philosophy, 2001

This is not your typical book about the A-theory/B-theory controversy in metaphysics. Peter Ludlow attempts something that few philosophers have tried in the last thirty years: he actually argues from linguistic premises for metaphysical conclusions. The relevant linguistic premises have to do with the nature of language, a general theory of semantics, the proper analysis of tense, and various technical theses involving the treatment of temporal indexicals and temporal anaphora (among other things). The metaphysical conclusions that Ludlow argues for from these linguistic premises are some of the main claims normally associated with the A-theory in the philosophy of time, namely, (i) that tense is a genuine feature of the world (which means, roughly, that there are monadic, temporal properties-like pastness, presentness, futurity, being two days past, being three days future, etc. (sometimes called "A-properties")-and that the instantiation of these properties does not somehow reduce to the instantiation of two-place, temporal relations like earlier than, simultaneous with, later than, etc.), (ii) that temporal becoming (roughly, successively coming to possess different A-properties) is intrinsic to all events, and (iii) that only the present is real. The overall plan of the book is as follows. First Ludlow spends four chapters defending a cluster of related claims about language and semantics in general and, in particular, the semantics for temporal indexicals and temporal anaphora. (Ludlow says that none of this material is original-he attributes most of it to Davidson, Chomsky, Evans, and Higginbotham-but it seems to me that a fair portion of what goes into this part of the book (including, especially, Ludlow's way of combining various ideas) is indeed both original to Ludlow and of genuine significance.) Then he devotes a chapter to developing a B-theory semantics, and another chapter to discussing what he takes to be certain insurmountable problems with the B-theory semantics. Next he devotes a chapter to developing an A-theory semantics, and another chapter to discussing what he takes to be the main problems

2004