Epistemic Emotions: The Case of Wonder

Thinking modally: English and contrastive studies on modality. Edited by J.R. Zamorano, C. Maíz, E. Domínguez & M.V. Martín de la Rosa. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 231-248., 2015

Laura Alba-Juez and Elena Martínez Caro’s paper is a corpus-based study of the use the expression no wonder in English. More specifically, the authors focus on two aspects of the use of the expression: 1) its function as a marker of epistemic modality and its relation to the expression of negative evaluation or stance; and 2) its apparent gradual change into a grammaticalized expression. The authors conclude that the expression no wonder mainly indicates the speaker’s opinion concerning the likelihood of the event described and that the expression has taken on a negative evaluative meaning. Structurally, the authors have found similarities between this expression and so-called pragmatic fragments, such as I think, I know, I guess.

In this essay, I attempt to address the (mis)educational problem of epistemic totality by reflecting on what I call " wonderment. " The essay is divided into two parts: the first is concerned with epistemic totality, and the second focuses on won-derment as a promising epistemologico-educational framework that can counteract epistemic totality. I base the term " epistemic totality " on Hannah Arendt's standpoint on totalitarianism as well as Michel Foucault's notion of episteme: totalitarianism being a logic that is usually mobilized by one idea and seeks to hold absolute control and authority over thinking, 1 and episteme here being (silent) structures of knowing. 2 In the first part of the essay, I briefly address the contemporary pertinence of epistemic totality and consider a few perspectives on the problem as well as a few suggested antidotes. In this part, I do not intend to exhaust theoretical formulations of totality; rather, I aim to gather certain challenges under the term " epistemic totality " in order to draw attention to the contemporariness and practical consequences of it, as well as to leave room to reflect on the difficulty of effecting antitotalitarian epistemic ruptures. Although the first part of the essay focuses on totality, the main concern of the essay is about wonderment as a counteragent working against this totality, gaining momentum in the second half. In this latter part, through discussing what I call cases of wonderment, I argue that, because wonderment creates epistemic ruptures that are inherently antitotalitarian, it can provide a promising epistemolog-ico-educational framework. EpistEmic totalitarianism and contEmporary timEs Arendt writes that totalitarianism is nourished by a grand and fixated explanation — logic — of reality. Furthermore, it is usually based on one idea that it considers to be the truth. She writes how totalitarianism creates a " fantastically fictitious consistency " (OT, 352) in explaining reality by ordering the facts into an absolute and straightforward logical procedure. Consequently, when this logic appropriates structures of knowledge, it can lead to " epistemic violence, " 3 subjugation and closure against nonknowledge. A germane and present-day extension of epistemic totality as discussed above is what Emmanuel Levinas simply calls " war " : when " impositions " — or " concepts " , " generalities " such as a heretic or a threat — are imposed on the other, and hence the other's " alterity " is denied. 4 This appropriation of alterity prevents preserving the other as other, 5 and it is epistemically — if not physically and geographically — violent. A case in point can be the war of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East and the violence of Sunni Muslims against Others (Kurds and Christians, or non-" selves, " non-Sunnis, other nonknowers of " my " religion) which, aside from its main cause being prolonged and problematic imperial interventions, also feeds off epistemic totality.

The Value of Emotions for Knowledge, ed. L. Candiotto, 2019

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance that emotions can play in our epistemic life considering the state of the art of the philosophical debate on emotions. The strategy is the one of focusing on the three main models on emotions as evaluative judgements, bodily feelings, and perceptions, following the fil rouge of emotion intentionality for rising questions about their epistemic functions. From this examination, a major challenge to mainstream epistemology arises, the one that asks to provide prominence to the epistemic agent and to her affects. This chapter discusses these implications, also providing an overview of the many alternatives available nowadays in epistemology, arguing for an open, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to emotions in knowledge.

Emotion Review, 2022

This paper develops the claim that epistemic feelings are affective experiences. To establish some diagnostic criteria, characteristic features of affective experiences are outlined: valence and arousal. Then, in order to pave the way for showing that epistemic feelings have said features, an initial challenge coming from introspection is addressed. Next, the paper turns to empirical findings showing that we can observe physiological and behavioural proxies for valence and arousal in epistemic tasks that typically rely on epistemic feelings. Finally, it is argued that the affective properties do not only correlate with epistemic feelings but that we, in fact, capitalise on these affective properties to perform the epistemic tasks. In other words: the affective properties in question constitute epistemic feelings.

Topoi

Epistemology and Emotions, 2016

Somewhere along the course of evolution, and at some time in any one of us on the way from zygote to adult, some forms of detection became beliefs, and some tropisms turned into deliberate desires. Two transitions are involved: from functional responses to intentional ones, and from non-conscious processes to conscious ones that presuppose language and are powered by neocortical resources. Unconscious and functional mental processes remain and constitute an "intuitive" system that collaborates uneasily with the conscious intentionality of the "analytic" system. Emotions bridge these divides: in particular, specific feelings affect inference, cognition and metacognition. In what follows, after a brief reminder of the crucial role of emotions to rational thought and action in general, I first look at how fear affects belief. I then narrow my focus to some examples of what I shall refer to as epistemic feelings. These include specialized variants of fear and greed; and feelings of doubt, certainty, knowing and familiarity. I shall also describe some surprising recent findings about the influence of oxytocin on trust and about the direct influence of social conformity on perception and belief.

Studi di estetica, 2017

Discussing the notion of " epistemic emotions " as proposed by Morton (2010), and his argument for which intellectual virtues will be " hard to attain " without those emotions, I introduce the thesis for which epistemic emotions constitute one of the building blocks of intellectual virtues, in order to provide an explanation of the cognitive process that binds the two. Epistemic emotions are building blocks, as: (1) motivational component, and (2) transformative component, and they assay their causal role as necessary components (but not sufficient) of intellectual virtues. Framing the argument within virtue responsibilism, I explain the machinery that leads from epistemic emotions to intellectual virtues, and then from those to affective abilities, stressing the role of training in the process of transformation of the agent in the epistemic journey. Affective abilities, as the refined epistemic emotions that are ready to use within the practice of intellectual virtues, are the secure and beneficial dispositions that enhance the responsible practice of cognition.

2019

Emotions and epistemic rationality have been traditionally considered to be in opposition. In the last twenty years, the role of emotions in epistemology has been increasingly acknowledged, but there is no systematic argument for the rational assessability of emotions that is compatible with both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of emotions and fits with the epistemic rational assessability of mental states in general. This thesis aims to fill this gap. Using empirically informed philosophical methodology, I offer a novel account of the rational assessability of emotions that fits with the rational assessability of other mental states and that could in principle be accepted by cognitivist and some prominent non-cognitivist theories of emotions. The possibility to epistemically rationally assess emotions opens up a fresh set of questions that regards the nature of the evaluations involved in the emotions, the epistemic norms that apply to them and the extent to which we are e...

HAL (Le Centre pour la Communication Scientifique Directe), 2018

Papers of Surrealism, 2007

How to explain an artwork to a committee. The importance of not knowing. Wunderkammern and curiosity cabinets. Some thoughts on the real, the surreal and the contemporary surreal. The aspirations of words and the difficulties with ‘proof.’ Heterotopias. Questions rather than answers.