The Bonds of Truth. The Value of Emotions for Social Knowledge

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2012

Journal of Philosophy of Emotions, 2020

What would it mean for an emotion to successfully "recognize" something about an object toward which it is directed? This article draws from Rick Furtak's Knowing Emotions (2018) to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not only in terms of the "accuracy" of an emotional construal in a strictly epistemological sense, but also in terms of the quasi-ethical ideal of responding emotionally to what we encounter in ways that are "specific," "deep," and "balanced."

The Philosopher 108(4), 30-36, 2020

2016

ln Moral Tribes, Greene (2013) promotes the proposition that emotions are crucial for everyday decision making. The author thereby introduces subjectivity into the contemporaryphilosophical landscape, which is dominated by an analytic orientation and a need for objectivity. This perspective has philosophical and practical implications.

2004

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT: 52, 2003

Looking inside oneself for the springs of such passion might make a nice case of soul-searching, but is not necessarily the best means for advancing philosophical inquiry. The papers in this volume arise from an international symposium on emotions, and provide material for a continuing dialogue among researchers with different philosophical itineraries. Each essay addresses, in varying detail, the nature of emotions, their rationality, and their relation to value. Chapters I to VIII map the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the intricate relation between consciousness and the body. Chapters IX to XI analyse the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by powerful or persistent emotions. Chapters XII to XIV explore questions of normativity and value in making sense of emotions at a personal, ethical, and political level.

Acta Analytica, 2020

In this paper, I discuss the intrinsic value of truth from the perspective of the emotion studies in virtue epistemology. The strategy is the one that looks at epistemic emotions as driving forces towards truth as the most valuable epistemic good. But in doing so, a puzzle arises: how can the value of truth be intrinsic (as the most valuable epistemic good) and instrumental (being useful to the epistemic agent)? My answer lies in the difference established by Duncan Pritchard (Pritchard 2014) between epistemic value and the value of the epistemic applied to the case of subjective motivations to knowing. I argue that the value of truth is intrinsic as epistemic value and that this is not only compatible with the idea that truth can have different kinds of instrumental values but also that the subjective value of truth, disclosed by epistemic emotions, can make the value of truth stronger if regulated within patterns of virtuous enquiry.

This paper testifies the crucial importance of Philosophy for Children for Emotional Growth. It begins by establishing the open ended character of emotional processes, showing how feminist philosophers have criticized the fixed conception of negative valence of certain emotions, and how, ultimately, the normative structure of emotions is open to modification. Then, it shows how talking about emotional processes and emotional situations can foster emotional growth once we understand that the acquisition of language and emotional vocabulary is one way to best capture the open ended character of emotions. Finally, attention is turned to Philosophy for Children. Taking as an illustration the emotion of hope and its importance to inquiry, the paper concludes by examining in what way P4C both benefits and reinforces the previous insights about emotion theory.

The author discusses the difficulty in talking about emotions and related phenomena. Translations complicate the issue. However, emotions are a form of basic communication and organize themselves in order to establish lasting interpersonal relationships.

Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal

(online) blogs.uoregon.edu/ourj * Luke Currie is a unior philosophy major. His particular interests in philosophy concern questions in the subfields of ontology and ethics. After completing his undergraduate studies, Luke hopes to attend a graduate school that shares his research interests. Along with his fondness for philosophy, he listens to, plays, and writes music. He also enjoys experimental comedy, and draws in his spare time.