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Outline

Audit committee features and earnings management

2023, Heliyon

https://doi.org/10.1016/J.HELIYON.2023.E20825

Abstract

Past studies have investigated the relationship between audit committee features and earnings management and reported mixed and inconclusive results. Some studies have found a significant relationship, while others have not. This study aims to explain these mixed results in the literature by dividing earning management into two groups: accrual and real earnings management (at three levels of sales, general and administrative costs, production costs and cash flows operation) and reexamining the relationship. Design/methodology/approach: The statistical model used in this study is a multivariate regression model; further, the statistical technique used to test the hypotheses is panel data. Findings: The findings show that both the audit committee members' financial expertise and the audit committee's size affect the accrual earnings management. However, the results show no meaningful relationship between the audit committee features and real-based earnings management at any levels of sales, general and administrative costs, production costs and cash flow operation. In addition, the findings suggest no meaningful relationship between the independence of the audit committee's members and accrual earnings management. In other words, not separating the earning management into 'accrual' and 'real' could be the critical factor for the reported mixed and inconsistent results in the literature. Practical implications: The findings of the current study provide an important guideline for investors and stakeholders to separate 'accrual' from 'real' earning management and pay more attention to the importance of audit committee features to limit the opportunities of earnings management. Indeed, by understanding the relationship between audit committee features and earnings management, investors and stockholders can make appropriate decisions regarding the optimal choice of funds. Originality/value: Dividing the earning management into two groups (accrual versus real) and reexamining its relationship with the audit committee features is new in this paper. Identifying one of the possible reasons for the past mixed and inconsistent results in the literature is also an incremental contribution provided by this study.

Key takeaways
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  1. The study reveals a significant relationship between audit committee financial expertise and accrual earnings management.
  2. Audit committee size positively influences accrual earnings management, enhancing oversight capabilities.
  3. No meaningful relationship exists between audit committee independence and accrual or real earnings management.
  4. Separating earnings management into accrual and real categories clarifies mixed results found in prior literature.
  5. The research provides practical implications for stakeholders to minimize earnings manipulation risks through effective audit committee features.

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FAQs

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How does audit committee financial expertise impact earnings management?add

The study reveals a significant relationship between financial expertise of audit committees and accrual earnings management (P = 0.000), indicating that knowledgeable members may deter such practices.

What effects does the size of the audit committee have on earnings management?add

Larger audit committees showed a significant relationship with accrual earnings management (P = 0.025), suggesting enhanced oversight capabilities due to diverse expertise among members.

Why is the independence of audit committee members critical for earnings management prevention?add

The independence of audit committee members was found to have no significant relationship with either accrual or real earnings management, highlighting potential weaknesses in oversight mechanisms.

What are the distinctions between accrual and real earnings management in this context?add

Accrual management involves manipulating accounting figures, while real earnings management pertains to altering actual business activities; findings demonstrate differential impacts of audit features on these types.

What limitations affect the generalizability of findings from Tehran Stock Exchange data?add

Data limitations include potential inaccuracies in financial records, restricted sample sizes, and a lack of qualitative context; thus, results may not be applicable to other contexts.