Examining corporate governance disclosures of listed companies in Fiji
In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - int... more In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - introduced the Code of Corporate Governance (the Code). The Code is ‘principle-based’ and requires companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) and the financial intermediaries to disclose their compliance with the Code’s principles. While compliance with the Code is mandatory, the nature and extent of disclosure is at the discretion of the complying entities. Agency theory and signalling theory suggest that firms with higher expected levels of agency costs will provide greater levels of voluntary disclosures as signals of strong corporate governance. Thus, the study seeks to test these theories by examining the heterogeneity of corporate governance disclosures by firms listed on SPSE, and determining the characteristics of firms that provide similar levels of disclosures. We conducted a content analysis of corporate governance disclosures on the annual reports of firms from 2008-2012. The study finds that large, non-family owned firms with high levels of shareholder dispersion provide greater quantity and higher quality corporate governance disclosures. For firms that are relatively smaller, family owned and have low levels of shareholder dispersion, the quantity and quality of corporate governance disclosures are much lower. Some of these firms provide boilerplate disclosures with minimal changes in the following years. These findings support the propositions of agency and signalling theory, which suggest that firms with higher separation between agents and principals will provide more voluntary disclosures to reduce expected agency costs transfers. Semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders further reinforce the findings. The interviews also reveal that complying entities positively perceive the introduction of the Code. Furthermore, while compliance with Code brought about additional costs, they believed that most of these costs were minimal and one-off, and the benefits of greater corporate disclosure to improve user decision making outweighed the costs. The study contributes to the literature as it provides insight into the experience of a small capital market with introducing a ‘principle-based’ Code that attempts to encourage corporate governance practices through enhanced disclosure. The study also assists policy makers better understand complying entities’ motivations for compliance and the extent of compliance.
The Nature and Concept of Accountability: A Case Study of Three Entities in Fiji
Accounting, 2015
The notion of accountability is a vague concept. This is because the appropriateness of accountab... more The notion of accountability is a vague concept. This is because the appropriateness of accountabilities depends on the context in which accountability is discharged to the recipient of information. The impetus for this study stems from a critical issue of whether discharging accountability to stakeholders by entities can be generalizable to all accountability structures and to understand how appropriately accountabilities are being rendered by entities in Fiji to their stakeholders. In light of this, our research method involves a case study of three entities in Fiji namely, Paradise Beverages (Fiji) Ltd, Home Finance Company Ltd (HFC) and Greenpeace Australia Pacific (GAP). Interviews were also conducted with three individuals from these three entities. The findings indicate that accountability is always context specific. Accountabilities towards stakeholders can be improved on but cannot be generalized to other accountability structures. This study contributes to our understandin...
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Examining corporate governance disclosures of listed companies in Fiji
In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - int... more In 2009, the Capital Markets Development Authority (CMDA) - Fiji’s capital market regulator - introduced the Code of Corporate Governance (the Code). The Code is ‘principle-based’ and requires companies listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) and the financial intermediaries to disclose their compliance with the Code’s principles. While compliance with the Code is mandatory, the nature and extent of disclosure is at the discretion of the complying entities. Agency theory and signalling theory suggest that firms with higher expected levels of agency costs will provide greater levels of voluntary disclosures as signals of strong corporate governance. Thus, the study seeks to test these theories by examining the heterogeneity of corporate governance disclosures by firms listed on SPSE, and determining the characteristics of firms that provide similar levels of disclosures. We conducted a content analysis of corporate governance disclosures on the annual reports of firms from 2008-2012. The study finds that large, non-family owned firms with high levels of shareholder dispersion provide greater quantity and higher quality corporate governance disclosures. For firms that are relatively smaller, family owned and have low levels of shareholder dispersion, the quantity and quality of corporate governance disclosures are much lower. Some of these firms provide boilerplate disclosures with minimal changes in the following years. These findings support the propositions of agency and signalling theory, which suggest that firms with higher separation between agents and principals will provide more voluntary disclosures to reduce expected agency costs transfers. Semi-structured interviews conducted with key stakeholders further reinforce the findings. The interviews also reveal that complying entities positively perceive the introduction of the Code. Furthermore, while compliance with Code brought about additional costs, they believed that most of these costs were minimal and one-off, and the benefits of greater corporate disclosure to improve user decision making outweighed the costs. The study contributes to the literature as it provides insight into the experience of a small capital market with introducing a ‘principle-based’ Code that attempts to encourage corporate governance practices through enhanced disclosure. The study also assists policy makers better understand complying entities’ motivations for compliance and the extent of compliance.
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